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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores British reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919 and the Croke Park 
Massacre 1920. It centres on the British Government’s response to these massacres, and 
the perspectives of two opposed political groups: the British and Irish Unionists, and the 
Labour Party. Connections and comparisons are drawn between the Government 
response to both cases and the official representations of the events. Right-wing 
criticism of the Government's management of the Amritsar crisis is discussed. How the 
right-wing response connected to the Croke Park Massacre is evaluated. Notions of 
'Britishness' and how these were used to bolster the arguments presented by the 
Government and the right wing are also considered. The right-wing defence of Amritsar 
is contrasted with the reaction of the Labour Party. This thesis demonstrates how 
Labour objected to both massacres and challenged the official portrayals of the 
shootings. The Labour Party's support for Indian and Irish nationalists and preferred 
approach to imperial rule in India and Ireland in 1920 is illustrated. The reactions of the 
right wing and the Labour Party are continuously juxtaposed with the official responses. 
How British reactions to the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre were 
connected by the overriding context of 'imperial crisis' is highlighted throughout. This 
thesis contributes to existing comparative and connected studies on India, Ireland and 
imperial violence in the interwar period, as well as general studies on the Amritsar 
Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre. It draws attention to similarities, differences, 
and connections between both cases, which are absent from existing historiography. 
This thesis employs several primary sources that have been under-utilised by 
historians, and gives sufficient focus to the left-wing response which has previously 
received limited scholarly attention. 
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British Reactions to Amritsar and Croke Park: Connections and Comparisons 
Introduction 
 
The Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre were two episodes of British 
imperial violence that remain controversial events in British, Indian and Irish history. 
This thesis will analyse the reactions that these massacres inspired in Britain. This 
study centres on the British Government’s response, and the perspectives of two 
polarised political groups: the British and Irish Unionists, and the Labour Party. How 
and why these two political extremes challenged the official view will be explored. This 
thesis will focus predominantly on reactions to these atrocities in British Parliament 
and the press, whilst drawing connections and comparisons between the varying 
perspectives and portrayals of both cases. 
This thesis is not concerned with investigating how and why Amritsar and Croke Park 
took place, as these questions dominate existing scholarship. However, the first section 
of this introduction will provide an overview of the massacres for contextual purposes, 
based on the facts that have been generally agreed upon by historians. Contentious 
details will be avoided, and the historiographical debates on these will be discussed in 
chapter 1. This section will also provide a brief insight into the political climate in which 
these massacres took place. The following section of this introduction explains the 
British political context of this thesis. It is important to outline the political landscape in 
Britain from 1919-1920 here, as it was within this framework the Government and the 
Opposition had to respond to Amritsar and Croke Park. The final sections will provide 
insight into the methodology and key sources used, and a chapter outline that will 
clarify the scope of this thesis.  
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The Massacres at Amritsar and Croke Park: An Overview 
Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, had promised Indian nationalists in 1917 
that India’s loyalty during the war would be rewarded with a move towards self-
government. Hence, after the armistice Indian expectations were high and eventual 
independence seemed possible. India was relatively stable at this time, especially in 
comparison to Ireland. However, the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which offered 
India dyarchy, "a system of power sharing in which Indians could be elected to hold 
office at the provincial level only"1, came as a disappointment, and Indian nationalists 
became increasingly disaffected with the imperial administration. In addition, the 
Government of India introduced the Rowlatt Acts in March that same year, which 
permitted the British authorities to use extreme powers of surveillance and arrest, such 
as those seen during the war. This snubbed Indian expectations of the end of wartime 
emergency measures and a move towards implementing home rule.2  
Consequently, a number of hartals (a form of protest which involved the closing of 
workplaces and businesses) were held across India in objection to the harsh legislation. 
Violence had broken out in Delhi during one of these protests, but the city of Amritsar 
had remained peaceful. However, on the 10th April 1919 the Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Punjab, Sir Michael O’Dwyer, had two renowned Indian nationalists arrested in 
Amritsar, to prevent them from speaking to the public about current political 
grievances. This provoked riots to start across the city. Brigadier General Reginald Dyer, 
who was stationed just a few hours away, was informed of the unrest. He arrived in 
                                                          
1 Shereen Ilahi, Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence: India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire 
(New York, 2016), p.6. 
2 Ibid. 
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Amritsar the following day and immediately assumed command, with the intention of 
restoring order.3 
By the 13th of April, Amritsar had quietened. Still, General Dyer sent out a proclamation 
that morning prohibiting public gatherings in the city. However, it was the day of the 
Baisakhi festival and tens of thousands of people were gathering in Amritsar to 
celebrate.  Many convened at the Jallianwala Bagh, a large enclosure near the Golden 
Temple at the heart of the city. Dyer’s proclamation was read out at nineteen different 
spots around Amritsar that day, yet the area around the Golden Temple was avoided.  
At approximately 4.15pm, General Dyer marched a special force of 50 armed riflemen 
into the Jallianwala Bagh, and without warning, fired 1620 rounds upon the crowd of 
25,000 people.4 Hundreds were killed instantly, and thousands more wounded. Dyer 
had also ordered a curfew in the city that prevented sufficient aid being given to the 
injured, thus many more died in the night.5 Official figures placed the death toll at 379, 
but Indian estimations contest that the true number of fatalities was much higher. The 
Amritsar Massacre remains the largest civilian bloodshed during peacetime in the 
history of the British Empire.6  
The following year, 14 spectators at a football match in Dublin suffered a very similar 
fate. Unlike India, which had been given hope during the war by Montagu’s promise for 
self-government, Irish nationalists’ aspirations had become increasingly frustrated. 
Ireland had been assured home rule in 1912 and this was due to be implemented in 
September 1914, but the outbreak of WWI meant that it was postponed. Nationalist 
frustrations peaked in Easter 1916 when a group of radicals declared an Irish Republic. 
                                                          
3 Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar (New York, 2005), pp. 234-235. 
4 Rosemary Rees, India 1900-47 (Oxford, 2006), p. 69. 
5 Susan Kingsley Kent, Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918-1931 (Basingstoke, 2009), p. 64. 
6 Chandrika Kaul, Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India, C. 1880-1922 (Manchester, 2003), p. 199. 
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Britain responded to the Easter Rising with extreme force, and “alienated the majority 
of Irish public opinion”.7 By 1918 home rule was no longer going to satisfy the growing 
number of Irish Republicans who sought independence. This increase in support for 
more radical Irish nationalism became clear during the 1918 general election, when 
Sinn Fein gained 73 seats and decimated the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), which 
supported home rule. However, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the British 
Parliament. 8 Instead, they set up their own parliamentary body, Dáil Éireann, and 
sparked the Irish War for Independence. 
By November 1920, guerrilla war had been waged in Ireland by the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) for nearly two years, hence, there were thousands of British 
counterinsurgency police and soldiers in Dublin. These included the 'Black and Tans', 
ex-soldiers recruited as temporary constables into the Irish Royal Constabulary (IRC), 
and the Auxiliaries, a paramilitary division of the IRC comprising of ex-British Army 
officers.9 Nevertheless, on the morning of 21st November 1920, the IRA visited eight 
addresses across Dublin, assassinated thirteen British men, and wounded six more. The 
majority of those targeted were British Army officers.10 
That afternoon, a Gaelic football match between Tipperary and Dublin was due to take 
place at Croke Park football ground. The proceeds of the match were to go to the 
families of IRA volunteers who had been killed or captured during the war so far. The 
IRC were aware that this match was scheduled. It began at 3:15pm, with between 5,000 
and 15,000 spectators in attendance. At 3:25pm, a heavily armed force of Black and 
                                                          
7 Ilahi, Imperial Violence, p.6. 
8 Malcom Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart, British Political History 1867-1990, Democracy and Decline 
(London, 1992), p. 219. 
9 David Leeson, 'Death in the Afternoon: The Croke Park Massacre, 21 November 1920', Canadian Journal 
of History, vol. 38 (2003), pp. 45-46. 
10 Ibid., pp. 46-48. 
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Tans and of Auxiliaries drove to the ground and fired 114 rounds into the crowd. Seven 
spectators were shot dead instantly, five were trampled to death by the panicked crowd, 
and another five were fatally wounded. The British forces fired for approximately 90 
seconds, resulting in a total of 14 civilians being killed.11 The next day the Freemans 
Journal reported: "AMRITZAR REPEATED IN DUBLIN".12 
 
British Political Context 
The Government in power during the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre 
was the Liberal-Conservative coalition led by David Lloyd George. In preparation for the 
1918 general election, Prime Minister Lloyd George, and the Leader of the Conservative 
Party Andrew Bonar Law, negotiated an electoral pact which gave their approval to 
coalition-supporting MPs. This was an attempt to maintain the existing war-time 
coalition. The approval was given in a letter to pro-coalition candidates signed by both 
parties, and became known as the ‘coupon’. Where a 'couponed Liberal’ ran in the 
election, no Conservative would challenge them, and vice versa. Thus, the Conservative 
party (or the Unionists as they were more commonly known at this time) won a 
majority with 335 'couponed' seats, but remained in coalition with Lloyd George's 
Liberals who made up a further 133 seats for the Government. The Labour Party 
emerged for the first time as the main opposition with 57 MPs. 28 Independent Liberals 
and 7 Irish Parliamentary MPs also sat in opposition to the Government. 13  Sinn Fein’s 
boycott of British Parliament meant that the Irish Parliamentary Party were the only 
Irish nationalists to sit in the House of Commons in 1919 and 1920.  
                                                          
11 Ibid., pp. 48-58. 
12 Freeman's Journal, 22 November 1920, p. 5. 
13 Pearce and Stewart, British Political History, p. 219. 
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The Government's majority in Parliament enabled them to direct the House of 
Commons with few obstructions. However, cracks within the Liberal-Unionist coalition 
became increasingly visible along ideological lines in the immediate inter-war years. 
These were particularly obvious during the Amritsar debate. Moreover, the composition 
of British Parliament affected the way in which issues in India and Ireland were dealt 
with by the Government. For example, most Liberals were against the repressive 
policies in Ireland, however, the Unionists’ majority enabled them to have significant 
sway over the Irish question. The Unionists fervently maintained a zero-tolerance 
stance towards Irish nationalism.14 Hence, the British political climate affected the 
responses of the Coalition Government and the Opposition to both massacres. 
Nonetheless, the political landscape in Britain remained relatively consistent from April 
1919 to the end of 1920, during both massacres and their aftermath. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
This thesis will add to ongoing research that adopts comparative and transnational 
approaches to Indian and Irish history. The nature of transnational and comparative 
methods has been debated by historians. For example, Peter Baldwin argues that the 
comparative method is essentially concerned with causality,15 whereas Haupt and 
Kocka maintain that comparative history “deals with similarities and differences”. They 
go on to separate this from transnational history, which they describe as dealing with 
                                                          
14 Ibid., pp. 221-222. 
15 Peter Baldwin, 'Comparing and Generalizing: Why All History is Comparative, Yet No History is 
Sociology', in Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Conner (eds.), Comparison and History, Europe in a Cross-
National Perspective (New York, 2004), p. 18. 
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“transfer, interconnection, and mutual influences across boundaries.”16 The 
transnational method is more concerned with interconnectivity. This study will look at 
comparisons mostly, but combines both comparative and transnational approaches. 
This thesis will identify similarities and differences between British reactions to the 
Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre, but also draw connections between 
these responses, recognising how the Indian and Irish cases interlock. 
A variety of primary sources will be utilised throughout this thesis. Parliamentary 
debates make up a substantial amount of this material, as well as official documents 
such as Cabinet memoranda. These sources will provide insight into the Government's 
reactions to both massacres, and the numerous arguments presented in Parliament. 
Newspapers will also be analysed in this study. For example, the Morning Post will be 
used to understand the right-wing stance, and Daily Herald to demonstrate the views of 
the Labour Party. Other under-utilised sources such as the Report of the Labour 
Commission to Ireland will also receive sufficient attention. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The first chapter of this thesis will discuss literature on Amritsar and Croke Park, and 
comparative and connected studies on India, Ireland and imperial violence. This chapter 
will introduce debates that are central to this study, highlight gaps in the existing 
scholarship, and identify where this thesis is positioned within these historiographies. 
                                                          
16 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, ‘Preface’, in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka eds., 
Comparative and Transnational History, Central European Approaches and New Perspectives (New York, 
2009), p. vii. 
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Chapter 2, ‘Constructing the British Government View of Amritsar and Croke Park’, will 
analyse the initial Government response to both massacres, and the nature of the 
subsequent inquiries into these atrocities. This chapter will show how the official 
portrayals of the massacres were constructed, and how the Government view was 
defended in Parliament. Chapter 2 is significant as the reactions and representations 
discussed in the remaining chapters are continuously juxtaposed with the official 
responses. 
The third chapter of this thesis will address the right-wing defence of General Dyer. Less 
attention will be given to this topic as it pervades existing scholarship. However, new 
connections and comparisons will be drawn between the right-wing response in 
Parliament and the press, and the Government's portrayal of Croke Park. The right-wing 
defence of Dyer also provides contrast to the final chapter of this thesis on the Labour 
Party. 
Chapter 4, ‘The Labour Party Response to Amritsar and Croke Park’, will focus on the 
views presented in the Labour press and by Labour MP’s in the House of Commons. 
Similarities and differences between Labour perspectives in both cases will be 
identified, and comparisons will be made with the right-wing stance and official 
representations of the massacres. This chapter will provide insight into the left-wing 
reaction to Amritsar and Croke Park which has thus far been neglected by historians.  
Each chapter of this thesis focuses extensively on the language used in public and 
political discourse to ascertain British attitudes to these atrocities. These individual 
chapters have been chosen as they provide interesting comparisons, and shed light on 
areas which have previously been ignored. There are several other areas that warrant 
investigation, for example, the response of the Independent Liberals who sat in 
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opposition to the Government, and women’s perspectives on the massacres. However, 
these topics were beyond the scope of this research. This thesis aims to demonstrate the 
contrasting responses of two political extremes in Britain, in relation to the 
Government’s reactions, and highlight the connections and comparisons between the 
varying portrayals of these two episodes of British imperial violence. 
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter outlines relevant historiographies to provide context for the discussions 
found in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The previous scholarship highlighted 
here will be addressed in two parts. The first covers general studies on the Amritsar 
Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre, outlining the debates over what happened at 
the Jallianwala Bagh and Croke Park, and why. This thesis is less concerned with the 
‘truth’ of these events as argued by historians and more with varying perceptions of the 
shootings as understood and promoted at the time. Nonetheless, it is important to 
reflect upon this literature as it not only provides a backdrop for this study, but the 
arguments presented by these historians are rooted in contemporary portrayals of the 
massacres. The subsequent section of this chapter on comparative and connected 
studies gives focus to the work of historians who have taken comparative or 
transnational approaches to investigating India, Ireland and colonial violence. This 
thesis is positioned in relationship to the content, methodologies and conclusions of this 
scholarship. 
 
General Studies on Amritsar and Croke Park 
British scholarship on the Amritsar Massacre has presented contending views since the 
1960s. Key debates focus on why General Dyer opened fire, whether his decision was 
warranted, and to what extent his actions were representative of the British imperial 
administration. Several British historians have attempted to justify Dyer's actions. 
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Rupert Furneaux explains that General Dyer suffered from arteriosclerosis, which 
impeded Dyer's judgement causing him to misunderstand the situation at Amritsar.1 
Brian Bond argues that India was in a state of open rebellion and that Amritsar was "the 
outstanding trouble spot".2 He maintains that Dyer was only doing his duty by restoring 
order. Bond also defends Dyer’s person, claiming that "his long military career provides 
no sinister indications of latent irresponsibility or a liking for bloodshed."3 This echoed 
a popular contemporary British portrayal of General Dyer as a valiant colonial officer 
committed to doing his duty, who supressed a rebellion that could have seen a 
"repetition of the miseries and cruelties" of 1857.4 This sympathetic portrayal and 
defence of Dyer is also upheld by Alfred Draper in his 1981 publication. He describes 
Dyer as "the simple soldier motivated by a deep sense of duty and thrown to the wolves 
because of it."5 Likewise, Nick Lloyd argues that Dyer "continued to fire for one simple 
reason: there were still people in the Jallianwala Bagh and it was his duty to disperse 
them."6 Again, the notion of 'duty' is emphasised. Lloyd also maintains that the shooting 
was not premeditated; Dyer simply panicked upon seeing the size of the crowd. These 
arguments mirror those of right wing contemporaries who supported Dyer in the 
aftermath of Amritsar. 
In contrast, Nigel Collett emphasises General Dyer's personal culpability.7 However, 
whilst challenging the defensive interpretations presented by Furneaux, Bond, Draper 
and Lloyd, his inclination to place full blame on Dyer involves presenting the crisis as 
                                                          
1 Rupert Furneaux, Massacre at Amritsar (London, 1963), p. 164. 
2 Brian Bond, 'Amritsar, 1919', History Today, vol. 13 (1963), p. 667. 
3 Ibid., p. 669. 
4 A letter written by Anglo-Indian women, Miss Sherwood, who was beaten by Indian men in the days 
preceding the Amritsar Massacre. Quoted by Edward Carson, House of Commons, 08 July 1920, vol. 131, c. 
1757. 
5 Alfred Draper, Amritsar, The Massacre that Ended the Raj (London, 1981), p. 16. 
6 Nick Lloyd, The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day (London, 2011), p. 179. 
7 Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar (New York, 2005). 
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resulting from the exceptional actions of one man.  As Shereen Ilahi puts it: "focusing on 
the personality and judgements of General Dyer typically results in a narrative that 
depicts the Amritsar Massacre as anomalous."8 This 'singularity argument', which 
considers the massacre as an isolated event, was put forward by both pro-Dyer and 
anti-Dyer groups in 1920, and is upheld by most other British works that have been 
written specifically on Amritsar. Considering the massacre in isolation means that the 
shameful event can be set apart from the mainstream of British imperial – and national 
– history.9 Nevertheless, the 'singularity argument' has also been persistently 
challenged by Indian nationalist discourse. For example, V. N. Datta insists that the 
massacre was not an isolated incident, but an "expression of a confrontation between 
the ruler and the ruled."10 To Indian nationalists, Amritsar was far from a-typical, and 
thus the imperial administration should be held responsible for the massacre, as 
opposed to General Dyer alone. As we will see in chapter 4, this argument featured in 
the Labour Party's response. 
As well as attempting to explain what happened at Amritsar in April 1919 and 
condemning or defending General Dyer’s actions, previous scholarship has also 
considered contemporary reactions to the massacre to an extent. Furneaux clearly 
writes from a pro-Dyer perspective by only discussing the response of the pro-Dyer 
press in his short outline of the controversy.11 Ilahi offers a more holistic contribution, 
outlining the Indian reaction as well as the British response, and discussing the 
subsequent parliamentary debates. Yet, her coverage of the media reaction is brief and 
                                                          
8 Shereen Ilahi, Imperial Violence and the Path to Independence: India, Ireland and the Crisis of Empire 
(New York, 2016) p. 11. 
9 Derek Sayer, ‘British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920’, Past & Present, vol. 149 (1991), p. 
132. 
10 V. N. Datta, Jallianwala Bagh (Ludhiana, 1969), p. 9. 
11 Furneaux, Massacre at Amritsar, p. 142. 
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she gives more attention to Dyer's supporters than to his opponents. Similarly, Derek 
Sayer’s article identifies differing versions of events relayed by British MP’s and by the 
press during the Dyer debate. However, the left-wing reactions are beyond the scope of 
his article.12 The stance taken by the Left in the aftermath of Amritsar was significant, 
especially when drawing connections to the Irish case. Sayer does recognise the Irish 
connection but fails to provide detail on the situation in Ireland or any comparative 
conclusions. Ilahi also recognises the “Irish subtext” during the Dyer debate, arguing 
that attitudes towards unrest in Ireland influenced British reactions to Amritsar. 13 This 
is considered throughout chapter 2.  
In a similar way to the discussions on Amritsar, the key debates on the Croke Park 
Massacre focus on why Crown Forces started shooting and who should be held 
accountable. Irish nationalist historians argue that British forces went to Croke Park 
with murderous intentions, maintaining that the RIC fired into the crowd to avenge the 
assassinations of British soldiers committed by the IRA that morning.14 Conversely, 
imperial apologists such as Charles Townsend, are supportive of the British 
Government’s official account of the massacre. 15 This position maintains that British 
forces went to search the crowd, were fired upon by IRA insurgents, and returned fire in 
self-defence. Unfortunately, bystanders were injured and killed in the crossfire or in the 
subsequent stampede caused by the panicked crowd. 
In the aftermath of what was to become known in Ireland as the first ‘Bloody Sunday’, 
two military courts of inquiry were conducted. The documentation of these enquiries 
                                                          
12 Derek Sayer, ‘British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920’, p. 6. 
13 Ilahi, Imperial Violence, p. 98. 
14 Kevin Kenny, 'The Irish in the Empire' in Kevin Kenny (ed.), Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford, 
2004), p. 111. 
15 Charles Townsend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and 
Military Policies (Oxford, 1975), p. 130.  
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was withheld from the public for over 80 years, and was unavailable to historians such 
as Townsend who had commented on Croke Park prior to their release. David Leeson is 
one of few historians who have utilised these sources to date. He argues: 
These documents make it clear that, while neither critics nor apologists have 
been completely correct, the critical version of the massacre is more accurate 
than its rival. The police raid on Croke Park did not begin as a reprisal. The plan 
really was to stop the match and search the crowd. Once they reached the Park, 
however, the police began shooting without provocation. There were no rebel 
gunmen outside the Park, and there was no return fire from the crowd. The 
Croke Park Massacre was a battue, not a battle.16 
In his view, this new evidence demonstrates that the Croke Park Massacre was 
unprovoked, but that it was not premeditated, it was not a reprisal. Nevertheless, it was 
still a “battue”, which refers to indiscriminate shooting on a defenceless crowd.  
Moreover, in his rejection of the argument that the Croke Park Massacre was a reprisal, 
Leeson offers alternative explanations for why the Crown Forces started shooting. He 
suggests that they may have acted out of fear, going as far to say that “these men may 
have been almost as frightened as the spectators they attacked.”17 Another reason 
Leeson puts forward is that the first shots fired by the British were unintentional, 
maintaining that “accidental fire was common”. This accidental fire would have “caused 
panic among police and spectators alike, leading to further wild firing”.18 Finally, Leeson 
proposes that in the eyes of the British forces, fleeing spectators could have been 
construed as a guilty crowd, which, “in the minds of fearful and angry police”, gave them 
                                                          
16 David Leeson, 'Death in the Afternoon: The Croke Park Massacre, 21 November 1920', Canadian Journal 
of History, vol. 38 (2003), p. 45. 
17 Ibid., p. 64. 
18 Ibid. 
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a “license to kill”. Hence, several spectators received bullet wounds in the back. 19  These 
explanations somewhat resemble those presented by apologist historians and 
contemporaries who have attempted to defend the events that occurred at Amritsar. 
The pro-Dyer camp tried to justify the troops shooting without warning or provocation 
by claiming that Dyer's forces were fearful of being overwhelmed by the crowd, and 
accepted that Dyer's forces shot at those attempting to flee, because in the eyes of Dyer 
and his supporters, the Indian civilians attempting to escape were guilty. 
Ilahi challenges Leeson’s explanations. She clarifies that the eyewitness testimonies 
suggest that “the police entered Croke Park with guns blazing.”20 The evidence implies 
that they had started firing before entering the ground, and before the crowd began to 
flee. She maintains that the Croke Park Massacre was not a result of panic, fear, 
incompetence, or misunderstanding, as Leeson proposes; it was a reprisal for the IRA 
assassinations conducted earlier that day. She maintains that Croke Park was just 
another example of a reprisal conducted by Crown Forces during the Irish War for 
Independence, and highlights numerous cases that resemble Croke Park in order to 
illustrate this. Ultimately, Ilahi concludes that this campaign of reprisals was a result of 
an even wider issue: a culture of collective punishment and violence inherent to the 
British Empire.21 Ilahi draws connections between British rule in India and Ireland in 
order to substantiate this claim. Her arguments also resemble those of the Labour Party 
in 1920. Clearly, the debate over why the Croke Park Massacre occurred remains 
controversial.  
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 65. 
20 Ilahi, Imperial Violence, p. 146. 
21 Ibid., p. 147. 
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General historiography of these massacres is important to discuss, as continuities may 
be discerned between the debates outlined by historians and contemporary attitudes 
towards these events. Previous scholarship on Amritsar has explored contemporary 
attitudes to some extent. However, in the case of Croke Park, existing literature provides 
little analysis of the political, media, and public reactions that this massacre caused in 
Britain. In addressing this gap in the existing scholarship, attention will be paid to 
important primary sources such as British newspapers and the Report of the Labour 
Commission to Ireland, which have thus far been under-utilised by historians.22 Ilahi has 
begun the work of outlining the political reaction to Croke Park and she offers brief 
discussion on a selection of viewpoints from the British and Irish press. This thesis will 
build on her work, examining representations of Croke Park by politicians and the press 
in additional detail, as well as extending the scope to evaluate British perceptions of the 
victims and the perpetrators. 
 
Comparative and Connected Studies 
Despite similarities between the massacres being noted from the beginning, Ilahi’s 
recently published work is the only publication so far that examines both Amritsar and 
Croke Park together in any detail. Ilahi makes connections between the campaign of 
reprisals conducted in Ireland by British forces during the Irish War for Independence, 
and British enforcement of martial law in the Punjab in 1919. She interprets these 
approaches to colonial rule in a transnational context in order to demonstrate that a 
mind-set of martial law, a culture of collective punishment, and a skewed understanding 
                                                          
22 Leeson, 'Death in the Afternoon: The Croke Park Massacre, 21 November 1920', p. 45. 
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of the minimum force doctrine, were characteristic of the British imperial 
administration. 
This scholarship on British imperial violence in India and Ireland supports Indian 
nationalist interpretations of Amritsar, by challenging the idea that events such as 
Amritsar and Croke Park were a-typical. Ilahi strongly contests the ‘singularity 
argument’ by highlighting numerous cases of collective punishment that were 
conducted in the Punjab in 1919, and several examples of violent reprisals against 
civilians in Ireland during the Anglo-Irish War. Her transnational approach to 
discussing imperial violence in Ireland and India demonstrates that events such as these 
(whilst conceived under differing circumstances), were examples of an empire-wide 
practice. She uses this Indo-Irish comparison and the cases of Croke Park and Amritsar 
specifically to exemplify a much broader debate over the nature of British rule after the 
First World War.23 She explains that this culture was particularly aggressive after the 
Great War, due to the turbulent global political climate at the time. 24 
Furthermore, Ilahi criticises Townsend's perspective that the British avoided martial 
law across Ireland in 1920 because the Government disapproved of using unnecessary 
force.25 Townsend’s view echoes that of contemporary politicians who condemned 
Dyer's actions, by claiming it was not "the British way of doing business".26 Ilahi argues 
that the culture of collective punishment was in fact facilitated by Government policy, 
maintaining that "once the government identified a full scale rebellion, whether real or 
imagined (as in the Indian case), martial law and collective punishments became 
                                                          
23 Ilahi, Imperial Violence, p. 170. 
24 Ibid., p. 163. 
25 Ibid., p. 118. 
26 House of Commons Debate, 08 July 1920, vol. 131 c. 1730. 
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legitimate strategies in the official mind."27 Moreover, Ilahi highlights that the tradition 
of persistently framing the British Empire as a power of "civility, democracy and 
justice", both by contemporaries and historians such as Townsend, has caused cases of 
British imperial violence to be whitewashed.28 This thesis will contribute to this 
discussion. By analysing the language used in public and political discourse, this thesis 
will discuss the extent to which the British Government tried to frame themselves and 
their empire as a force for good in the aftermath of Amritsar and Croke Park, and to 
what degree this view was accepted, or indeed criticised. 
Whilst Ilahi is the only other historian to have focused on both Amritsar and Croke Park 
specifically, broader connections have been made between the violence in India and in 
Ireland in the inter-war years. Susan Kingsley-Kent analyses the Amritsar Massacre and 
the policy of reprisals in Ireland from 1919-1920, alongside several other cases of 
imperial violence. Kingsley-Kent argues that Britons suffered from a national state of 
‘shell shock’ after the trauma of the Great War, which caused a crisis of British identity 
that needed to be resolved. Repairing the ‘British psyche’ required a unified national 
identity, thus a narrative of ‘Englishness’ was constructed. However, the notion of 
‘Englishness’ depended upon a contrast of ‘Un-Englishness’, against which it “could be 
defined.”29 Understanding national belonging required understanding of who did not 
belong.30 Kent argues that a "shattered psyche" of the British people, the desire for 
"wholeness" and the construction of ‘Englishness’, caused endemic violence against 
colonial subjects after WWI. 31 However, whilst the psychological fallout of the Great 
War and the potential brutalisation of British society are notions that should be 
                                                          
27 Ilahi, Imperial Violence, p. 138. 
28 Ibid., p. 14. 
29 Susan Kingsley-Kent, Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma 1918-1931 (Basingstoke, 2009), p. 8. 
30 Ibid., p. 7. 
31 Ibid., pp. 10-35. 
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considered, as these provide insight into the much broader context of the time, here 
they are potentially being over played. Perhaps it is more useful to consider the 
psychological impact of war as another contributor to the catalytic context, in addition 
to the political and ideological threats of 'imperial crisis'. 
It is essential to highlight the importance of the broader context of ‘imperial crisis’ here. 
First conceived by John Gallagher in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the 
concept of imperial crisis views the turmoil experienced in the aftermath of the First 
World War, by both the losers and victors, as transnational and connected.32  
Essentially, the trauma of the war that was experienced across the globe resulted in the 
legitimacy of empire being called into question. Wilsonian ideas of self-determination, 
anti-colonial nationalisms, pan-Islamism and Bolshevism all gained traction. This 
threatened the structures of British imperialism, and influenced the way in which the 
British responded to situations in Ireland and India, including the massacres at Amritsar 
and Croke Park. While Susan Kingsley-Kent does not neglect to mention the broader 
crisis of empire and its influence on the numerous cases of violence across the globe 
which she addresses, she still identifies the psychological scars of war as the central 
cause of violence in the Empire, a conclusion which may be a little far-fetched. 
Indeed, Jon Lawrence suggests that historians may “have rather overdrawn” ideas of 
post-war brutalisation.33 In his article he addresses Amritsar and reprisals in Ireland as 
well as discussing the urban riots in Britain in 1919. He argues whilst the war may have 
contributed to increased violence, “it would be a mistake to attribute the riots of 1919 
                                                          
32 John Gallagher, 'Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1921', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15 
(1981), pp. 355-368. 
33 Jon Lawrence, 'Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First 
World War  Britain', The Journal of Modern History, vol. 75 (2003), p. 563.  
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solely to the brutalizing effects of war.”34 Lawrence recognises that imperial rule relied 
upon “the willingness ruthlessly to deploy the imperial power’s superior force of arms” 
and considers this “the traditional mechanics of imperial rule.”35 Hence, imperial 
violence in India and Ireland cannot be explained solely by the notion of post-war 
brutalisation. However, Lawrence also insists that we should not underestimate the fear 
of brutalisation felt by contemporaries.36 He maintains that this fear was reason for the 
narrative of ‘Englishness’ that was present throughout the Dyer debate. Lawrence 
argues that this narrative of ‘Englishness’ was constructed in order to reassure Britons 
that they were a peaceable people, who had turned their back on militarism, 37  rather 
than being a narrative that fostered violence in the way that Kingsley-Kent suggests. 
This thesis will recognise how ‘Britishness’ or ‘Englishness’ was used to bolster the 
arguments presented by the Government and its challengers during both controversies. 
The historiographies outlined here highlight key debates and concepts that underpin 
this study. Previous scholarship on Amritsar and Croke Park specifically is important to 
acknowledge as it illustrates the contentious nature of the massacres, and reflects the 
contrasting representations of these events that were advocated and criticised by 
contemporaries at the time. The comparative and connected studies on India, Ireland 
and imperial violence also feed in to this thesis. Ilahi's work, which connects martial law 
in the Punjab with the policy of reprisals in Ireland in order to demonstrate that 'ruling 
by the sword' was inherent to British imperialism, is fundamental to the political 
reactions discussed across the following chapters. In addition, the context of imperial 
crisis is central to this thesis and its influence will be highlighted throughout. Jon 
                                                          
34 Ibid., p. 572.  
35 Ibid., p. 576. 
36 Ibid., p. 563. 
37 Ibid., pp. 587-588. 
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Lawrence's notion of 'peaceableness' and his understanding of post-First World War 
British identity will also be considered. This thesis will evaluate the connections 
between the ideas and conclusions presented by this existing scholarship, and 
contribute to comparative and connected studies on India, Ireland and imperial 
violence, as well as to general studies on Amritsar and Croke Park. 
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Chapter 2 
Constructing the British Government View of Amritsar and Croke Park 
 
This chapter will discuss the British Government's portrayals of the Amritsar Massacre 
and the Croke Park Massacre, as they were constructed and presented in the aftermath 
of these two crises. Firstly, initial responses to each massacre will be analysed, and 
comparisons will be drawn between these. Then, the Government's approach to 
investigating the events at Croke Park and Amritsar will be addressed. This section will 
compare the nature of the inquiries conducted and contrast the ways in which the 
British Government utilised the results of these inquiries in order to construct and 
promote their official representation of the events. Finally, the chapter will establish the 
British Government's official view and consider the language used to promote this view 
and defend it in Parliament. This chapter aims to bring to light the similarities and 
differences between the Government response to and representations of the Amritsar 
Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre, and suggest reasons for and connections 
between these reactions to both cases. Before exploring the reactions of the 
Government, however, an overview of the organisation of British rule in India and 
Ireland will be provided for contextual purposes. The relationship between the Liberal-
Conservative Government and the Indian and the Irish imperial administrations was the 
framework in which these crises were managed, and official views of the events were 
developed. Hence, these structures are important to highlight here.  
Two key political figures were central to the construction and defence of the official 
representations of the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre: The Secretary 
of State for India and the Chief Secretary for Ireland. Both found themselves targets for 
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scrutiny after the shootings. The Secretary of State for India was head of the India Office, 
and in his Cabinet position was responsible for imperial policy relating to India, which 
was then communicated from London and carried out by the Government of India 
under the Viceroy. The Viceroy was responsible for the administration of the Provinces 
of British India, which in turn were controlled by Governors or Lieutenant-Governors. 
Indian involvement in the administration of the Raj was limited at this time. The 
Government of India, the Viceroy, and the Governors of the Provinces were all under the 
authority of the Secretary of State for India, and through him, British Parliament. During 
the Amritsar Massacre and the subsequent inquiry and debates, the Secretary of State 
for India was Coalition Liberal MP, Edwin Montagu.1 Lord Chelmsford was the Viceroy 
of India from 1916 until 1921,2 and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was Sir 
Michael O'Dwyer,3 who retired shortly after the massacre in May 1919. These 
administrative figures beneath the Secretary of State also played key roles in the 
aftermath of Amritsar.  
The structures of the Irish administration and its relationship with the British 
Government were different to that of British India. Unlike India, Ireland, as part of the 
United Kingdom, was represented in Parliament by Irish MPs, and administrators from 
the Government of Ireland sat in the House of Commons. This is important to note, as 
the presence of Irish MPs in British Parliament may have affected how the Government 
dealt with the Croke Park Massacre. In the Amritsar case however, there were no Indian 
                                                          
1 For more information on Edwin Montagu see, Chandrika Kaul, ‘Montagu, Edwin Samuel (1879–
1924)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2012, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35074, 
accessed 5 Sept 2017]. 
2 For more information on Lord Chelmsford see, P. G. Robb, ‘Thesiger, Frederic John Napier, first Viscount 
Chelmsford (1868–1933)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2008, 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36465, accessed 5 Sept 2017]. 
3 For more information on Sir Michael O'Dwyer see, Philip Woods, ‘O'Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–
1940)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2006, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35292, 
accessed 5 Sept 2017]. 
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MP's in office in 1919 and 1920 who could have potentially exercised this sort of 
influence. Nonetheless, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Sir Hamar Greenwood,4 played a 
similar role to Montagu in the Irish context. Greenwood was a Liberal MP at this time, 
but took the Conservative Whip in 1922. Nominally, the Chief Secretary was 
subordinate to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, who was also known as the Irish Viceroy. 
However, by the end of the 19th century the British administration in Ireland, 
metonymically known as 'Dublin Castle', was run by the Chief Secretary who, like 
Montagu, sat in the British Cabinet. The Chief Secretary controlled Government policy 
for Ireland, just as the Secretary of State directed policy in India. Both were responsible, 
more than anyone, for the administration of Ireland and India respectively, and both 
were accountable to British Parliament. These Cabinet roles put Edwin Montagu and 
Hamar Greenwood at the centre of the Amritsar and Croke Park controversies. The 
composition of the British Government and its relationship with the Government of 
India and the Government of Ireland remained unchanged throughout the massacres 
and their aftermath. 
 
Initial Response: Amritsar 
There was no immediate dramatic response from the British Government regarding the 
Amritsar Massacre. The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, was aware that 
rioting had occurred throughout the Punjab, but initially he had little knowledge of the 
shooting at the Jallianwala Bagh. A War Cabinet Memorandum described that "grave 
disorders had occurred in various parts of India… The trouble occurred principally in 
                                                          
4 For more information on Hamar Greenwood see, Martin F. Seedorf, ‘Greenwood, Hamar, first Viscount 
Greenwood (1870–1948)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2009, 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33545, accessed 5 Sept 2017]. 
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the Punjab, particularly at Amritsar… Troops, were called in to restore order, and there 
were casualties on both sides… order has been restored in the areas of disturbance."5 
Official reports to the British Government from the Government of India such as these 
described the riots preceding the massacre, stating that casualties had occurred and 
order reinstated. However, there was no mention of the shooting on a crowd of 25,000 
unarmed civilians, let alone any objection to this action. In fact, evidence shows that 
some officials in the Government of India initially approved of Dyer’s actions.  
General Beynon, Dyer’s military superior, agreed with the decision to fire on the crowd,6 
as did the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O’Dwyer. During the 
subsequent inquiry into the Punjab disturbances, he stated: “I approved of General 
Dyer's action in dispersing by force the rebellious gathering.”7 However, little had been 
done by the Government of India in order to ascertain what actually happened and 
whether the firing was indeed necessary or justifiable; hence, this approval was perhaps 
a little premature. This was to be a criticism made by Indian members of the Hunter 
Commission, which was set up in October 1919 by the Government of India as 
requested by Montagu. The Indian members who produced a Minority Report for the 
Commission stated: “It does not appear that any steps were taken by the Government of 
the Punjab for a long time to ascertain the real facts about so serious an occurrence.”8 In 
fact, General Dyer was not required to provide a statement on his actions at Amritsar to 
the Government of India until August 1919, 9 and the Government of India only agreed 
to hold an inquiry into the uses of excessive force in the Punjab six months after the 
                                                          
5 National Archives, CAB/24/153, British Empire and Africa Report No. 115, 16 April 1919. 
6 British Library, IOR/L/PJ/6/1661, File 2005, Cutting from The Times, 09 February 1920. 
7 The Majority Report of the Hunter Commission, 1920, in Tim Coates ed,. The Amritsar Massacre: General 
Dyer in the Punjab 1919 (Guilford, 2000), p. 49. 
8 Minority Report of the Hunter Commission, 1920, in Tim Coates ed., The Amritsar Massacre: General 
Dyer in the Punjab 1919 (Guilford, 2000), pp. 79-80. 
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event, on the British Government’s request. It would appear that the Government of 
India were happy for this massacre at Amritsar to be overlooked. 
This initial silence from the Government of India was sustained by harsh press 
censorship which was imposed in the Punjab during the disturbances. The media had 
become something that had to be respected rather than ignored by governments and 
officials,10 as there was now little doubt of “the potency of media influence on the 
‘masses’”.11 Accordingly, governmental manipulation of the press became a formal 
strategy incorporated into the administration of the Empire.12 News management 
became an imperative part of governing India, especially in the context of imperial 
crisis. Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s press policy was particularly strict during this period. For 
example, Editor of the Bombay Chronicle and Labour Party member, Benjamin 
Horniman, who was sympathetic to the Indian nationalist cause, was exiled from India 
for circulating “inflammatory propaganda” in May 1920.13 Kaul described this as "an 
indication of the extent to which the Government was prepared to suppress reporting in 
India."14 This strict censorship restricted information regarding the massacre reaching 
Britain. Arguably, this kept Montagu and thus the British Government ignorant to the 
extent of the atrocity committed at Amritsar. 
Nonetheless, the Indian National Congress sent emissaries to London to give 
information directly to the Secretary of State for India about the treatment of Indian 
civilians during the Punjab disturbances, and to ask him to investigate allegations of 
excessive force. By June 1919, public demands for the Government of India to set up a 
Royal Commission of Inquiry were starting to emerge. In July, Sir Chettur Sankaran Nair, 
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who had recently resigned from the Viceroy's Executive Council due to the Viceroy’s 
lack of response to violence in the Punjab, went to London to petition for an inquiry.15 
This pressure for an investigation into the Punjab Disturbances was also supported by 
the Labour Party, as detailed in chapter 4. Eventually, these Indian allegations 
persuaded Montagu to concur that an official inquiry into the events of April 1919 was 
indeed necessary. The Hunter Commission of inquiry was set-up by the Government of 
India in October that year,16 during which reports on the massacre finally began to 
surface in the British press. It was from these newspaper articles published in autumn 
1919 that Montagu would claim that he learned the true nature and extent of General 
Dyer’s actions at Amritsar. He insisted that he only learned of the details of the Amritsar 
Massacre once they were printed in the Daily Express after the Hunter Commission had 
begun its investigation. Montagu maintained this claim in his private correspondence to 
the Editor of the Express, Ralph Blumenfeld.17 
However, Montagu’s claim of ignorance was contested by the Lieutenant-Governor Sir 
Michael O’Dwyer via private correspondence, and later by statements from O'Dwyer in 
the press. 18 In a letter sent to Montagu in December 1919, he maintained that he had 
provided the Secretary of State for India with full information of General Dyer’s actions 
six months earlier in June.19 Still, even if O'Dywer had provided Montagu with full 
details of the massacre at this point as he claimed, it was still almost 2 months after the 
shooting. Nonetheless, writing to the Viceroy a month later, Montagu insisted that 
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O'Dwyer’s reports had been unclear about the fatalities and how they were caused.20 He 
claimed that the following important details of Dyer’s orders had not been made known 
to him by O’Dwyer: “That the crowd might have dispersed without his firing on them, 
that he fired without warning, and that he stopped firing because his ammunition was 
exhausted.” 21 It was these details which were to become the grounds for the censure of 
General Dyer by the British Government.  
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, Sir T. Holderness, supported Montagu 
and agreed that the India Office in London had not been fully informed about events at 
Amritsar. He also criticised the Government of India for failing to initially provide 
sufficient information to the British Government. Holderness claimed:  
If I had been called upon during the summer or autumn of 1919 to prepare a 
statement for publication regarding the Jallianwala Bagh incident, and had 
framed it on the information verbally received by Sir M. O’Dwyer and on scanty 
information transmitted by the Government of India, the narrative would have 
been of a completely different complexion from the account of the facts…22  
Holderness held the "scanty information" provided by the Government of India as partly 
responsible for the initial silence and passivity over the Amritsar Massacre in Britain. 
Moreover, Holderness defended Montagu’s initial ignorance as he too had been 
unaware of the nature of the events.  He wrote to Montagu stating that “you were as 
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impressed as I was with the inadequacy of our knowledge of what really happened at 
Amritsar”.23 
These letters between Montagu and these key civil servants were private 
communications which eventually came into the public domain during the debate on 
the massacre in the House of Commons in July 1920. It is hard to determine exactly how 
much Montagu knew initially about the precise nature of events at Amritsar but the 
evidence suggests he was not fully informed either by Sir Michael O'Dwyer or by the 
Viceroy. The Daily Herald highlighted this in December 1919, stating that "the military 
in India must have deliberately kept Mr. Montagu in ignorance of their crime."24 The 
Manchester Guardian also drew this conclusion.25 It was for this reason, perhaps, that 
the Secretary of State for India did not immediately force the Viceroy to initiate an 
enquiry. It was only upon being pressured by Indian nationalists and the Labour Party 
that a general inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances was agreed to, and only upon the 
commencement of the Hunter Commission Inquiry and the subsequent publishing of 
reports in the British press, did Montagu realise the true circumstances and 
consequences of General Dyer’s actions. 
 
Initial Response: Croke Park 
In the case of the Croke Park Massacre, there was, in contrast, no dispute over whether 
or not the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Sir Hamar Greenwood, knew the details of the 
shooting from the very beginning. Thus, Greenwood managed to avoid much of the 
personal scrutiny that Montagu faced during the Amritsar controversy. One reason for 
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this is that, in contrast to their response to the massacre at Amritsar, the British 
Government were quick to respond to the shooting at Croke Park and to provide 
information to the British public. A short statement was circulated by Dublin Castle 
within hours of the event. This ensured that the story was picked up immediately by the 
British press. These initial reports were very brief, but by the morning of the 22nd 
November 1920 newspapers were printing more detailed accounts of the Croke Park 
Massacre. 26 In contrast, it had taken months for accounts of the shooting at Amritsar to 
become public knowledge, and this lack of circulation of information to the public was a 
key reason why Montagu had been criticised in the Indian case.  
Under the headline, “Battle on Football Field”, the Manchester Guardian relayed the first 
official account, stating:  
The official report says that when the military arrived they were fired on by 
some of the crowd. They returned fire, and there was a general stampede. In 
which some people were crushed… Several thousand people were searched and 
a few revolvers found.27 
The Daily Mail also reported this initial statement. 28  
The first official account from Dublin Castle was scant, but a second, more detailed 
official account of the massacre came immediately afterwards and was much more 
widely reported.29 This representation was delivered by the Chief Secretary to the 
House of Commons on the 22nd November 1920, the day after the shooting. However, it 
appears that the Government had hoped to keep discussions over Croke Park to a 
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minimum, or at least keep Parliament’s focus on the assassinations committed by IRA 
operatives on the morning of 21st November instead. Greenwood went into explicit 
detail in the House about the assassinations of the British officers, reciting graphic and 
emotive descriptions of each man’s death. For example, he described the murder scene 
at the Gresham Hotel: “Bed saturated, body and especially head horribly disfigured. 
Possibly hammer was used as well as shots to finish off this gallant officer."30 However, 
he did not mention Croke Park in his lengthy opening statement to the House. In 
response to this, Irish nationalist politician, Joseph Devlin,31 turned to the Prime 
Minister. He asked: 
I want to know from the Prime Minister why the House of Commons has not 
been made acquainted, in the recital of these other things that have occurred, 
with the onrush of the military into a football field, with fifteen thousand people, 
indiscriminate shooting, and ten men killed? Why was the House not told that 
when the other story was being told?32  
Devlin criticised Greenwood for providing extensive details on the assassinations of the 
British officers, but omitting the shooting at Croke Park, which he argued was part of 
the whole story.33  It was in response to Devlin’s criticism that Greenwood proceeded to 
relay the Government’s second statement on the Croke Park Massacre.  
The second official account was merely an extension on the first. The key points of the 
Government representation remained the same. Greenwood maintained that "the 
authorities had reason to believe that Sinn Fein gunmen came into Dublin”, that they 
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carried out the morning’s assassinations, and may have been hiding amongst the crowd 
at the football match. For this reason, British forces went to the playing fields “to search 
for arms”. 34  He then claimed: 
This force was fired upon and they fired back, killing 10 and wounding others. 
About 3'000 men were searched. Thirty revolvers and other firearms were found 
on the field. I regret to say that a woman and a man were crushed to death in the 
crowd.35  
This second statement incorporated several key points central to the official 
representation of Croke Park, which was being constructed in the immediate days after 
the shooting in an attempt to relinquish the Government of accountability. These points 
include accusations that the crowd were suspected of concealing Sinn Feiners, the 
crowd were armed with revolvers, the crowd fired at the British authorities first, and 
that deaths resulted from a stampede. These themes continued to be upheld in the third 
and most detailed portrayal of events, which was presented by the Chief Secretary to 
the House of Commons on the 23rd November 1920. This final official representation of 
the Croke Park Massacre will be discussed below. 
The immediacy of the British Government’s response to the Croke Park Massacre was 
clearly dissimilar to the initial response to Amritsar. The differences in the structures of 
British rule in India and Ireland are relevant here. The Secretary of State for India relied 
on the Viceroy for information, which hindered his ability to fully realise and react 
promptly to the Amritsar case. The Chief Secretary was both the administrative head of 
Dublin Castle (in practise) and first point of call within the British Cabinet on issues 
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regarding Ireland. Unlike Lord Chelmsford with Montagu, the Viceroy of Ireland could 
not limit information communicated to Greenwood. Hence, Greenwood was able to 
respond immediately. Other reasons for these contrasting initial reactions could also 
include the fact that press censorship was heavily enforced in India during the Punjab 
Disturbances, whereas censorship was much more relaxed in Ireland during the Anglo-
Irish conflict. Ilahi clarifies: “Unlike the Indian press, the Irish press was not heavily 
censored… as long as newspapers did not incite violence outright or engage in false 
reporting, Dublin Castle remained willing to allow them such freedom.” The press in 
Britain put pressure on the Government to uphold this lenient policy, as did the Labour 
Party.36  As previously discussed, press censorship in India ensured that initially, British 
politicians and the British press remained uninformed about Amritsar. With Ireland 
however, proximity to England made the transfer of information faster and easier, and 
the press was relatively free. This limited the Government's ability to suppress any 
unsavoury news in the same way that they had been able to on the subcontinent after 
the Punjab Disturbances. Nonetheless, this did not prevent the Government from 
actively trying to counter negative reporting. The Government had established a 
propaganda department within Dublin Castle by August 1920, with the purpose of 
counteracting "the plethora of adverse news reports with suppression or if suppression 
be either undesirable or impossible, the neutralisation, so far as possible, of the 
unfavourable factors in news".37 In the case of Croke Park, the Government did attempt 
to ‘inform’ newspapers in the Government's favour with some initial success, by 
whitewashing "unfavourable factors" from official statements. For example, the Daily 
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Mail’s first reports relayed the official statements regarding the shooting without 
question.38 
Additionally, it was not just the differing nature of administrative structures and 
censorship policies which resulted in contrasting initial responses from the British 
Government. The different national contexts in which these episodes of imperial 
violence occurred must also be acknowledged. The Irish War for Independence had 
been waged for over a year and public and political opinion in support of Britain’s policy 
in Ireland was very fragile, much more so than opinion over British policy in India had 
been prior to the massacre at Amritsar. Indeed, the Government had persistently been 
under fire from the Labour Party and Independent Liberals in the months preceding 
Croke Park, over violence committed by Crown Forces.39 Numerous campaigns 
protesting against violence and promoting peace in Ireland were also active, including 
the Peace with Ireland Council and the Anti-Reprisals Association.40 The increasingly 
hostile situation in Ireland was at the forefront of British politics and had been for years 
prior to, and during the First World War. Whilst the political landscape in India was 
posing new challenges for Britain and the Empire, these were not as long-standing or on 
the same scale as the outright violent conflict that was waging in Ireland in 1920, 
despite fears on the right that India was equally rebellious. Hence, it appeared 
imperative that British and Irish public opinion on the situation in Ireland was managed 
as effectively as possible. Perhaps it is for this reason the Government reacted so 
quickly and constructed an official representation of the events at Croke Park within 
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days of the massacre, and stuck with this portrayal regardless of the findings of the 
subsequent military courts of inquiry. 
 
Inquiry: Amritsar 
After demands from Indian nationalists, increasing pressure from the left in Britain, and 
resulting requests from Montagu, the Government of India finally set up the Hunter 
Commission on 14th October 1919.  Its remit was “to investigate the recent 
disturbances in Bombay, Delhi and Punjab… their causes, and the measures taken to 
cope with them".41 The Committee included three Indian members, four European 
members, and it was headed by Scottish judge and former Liberal MP, Lord William 
Hunter. All held positions within the Government of India or the High Court.42 A letter 
from Lord William Hunter explained the process by which the inquiry was conducted: 
The Committee heard evidence of witnesses on 8 days at Delhi, on 29 days at 
Lahore, on 6 days at Ahmedabad, and on 3 days at Bombay. All the witnesses, 
with the exception of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, General Hudson, Mr. Thomson, and 
Sir Umar Ayat Khan, who gave their evidence in camera, were examined in 
public.43 
The Commission were rigorous in gathering evidence, so much so, that Sir Michael 
O’Dwyer became offended by the proceedings of the investigation, and held a “grudge” 
against the Commission for years after the controversy had subsided.44  
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The Hunter Commission produced two reports based on their findings. The Majority 
Report, which was produced by the European members of the Commission, and the 
Minority Report which was written by the Indian members. Although the Minority 
Report does take a much harsher stance towards Dyer, overtly censuring his actions, the 
only point the reports significantly differed on with regards to Amritsar specifically was 
their discussion of the treatment of the dead and wounded. The Majority Report does 
not acknowledge this point, unlike the Minority Report which states that Dyer 
"immediately left the place with his troops and did not do anything to see that either the 
dead or wounded received help. He did not consider it to be ‘his job’”45 Other than this, 
both reports which were published in May 1920 covered the same key points, with the 
Majority Report being used as the official grounds for General Dyer’s censure by the 
Government of India and the British Government.46 
Firstly, the reports concluded that the proclamation banning assemblies was not 
sufficiently made known to Indians (both locals and visitors), who were in Amritsar that 
day. The Majority Report stated that “it is evident that in many parts of the city the 
proclamation was not read.”47 The Minority Report verified this. Dyer himself admitted 
to the Hunter Committee that he knew it was possible that some people at the meeting 
may not have heard the proclamation.48 Secondly, the reports stated that the crowd 
were peaceful and unarmed.49 Thirdly, the committee found that General Dyer gave no 
warning to the crowd before firing, and violated the minimum force doctrine by 
continuing to fire on the dispersing crowd. This conclusion was drawn based on Dyer’s 
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own military report of events.50 The fourth conclusion the Commission made was that 
Dyer had misunderstood his duty. Rather than dealing with the issue at hand, General 
Dyer aimed to teach the Punjab as a whole a lesson in submission. In General Dyer’s 
report, he stated: “It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one 
of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those 
who were present, but more specially throughout the Punjab. There could be no 
question of undue severity.”51 General Dyer also said that he “was going to give them a 
lesson…was going to punish them.”52 This supports Metcalf and Metcalf's analysis that 
“for many among the British, the massacre confirmed widely held assumptions about 
how Indians ought to be governed… Indians, like children, when naughty needed to be 
severely punished.”53 The notion that Indian people were like children was popular in 
Anglo-Indian thought, and was often used to deny the Indian people self-government 
and legitimise British rule. Indians, like children, were incapable of governing 
themselves. 
The conclusions of the Hunter Commission's Majority Report became central to the 
Government's portrayal of the Amritsar Massacre, and were used to censure General 
Dyer and maintain that that censure was right and justified. A Memorandum circulated 
by the Secretary of State for India on 6th May 1920 recommended General Dyer for 
censure by the British Government, based on the Commission's findings.54 
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Inquiry: Croke Park 
Demands for an investigation into reprisals against Irish civilians were raised by MPs a 
month before the Croke Park Massacre, but were rejected as the Government insisted 
that there were no grounds for inquiry. A Commons debate was also held on 20th 
October to discuss the motion moved by Labour MP Arthur Henderson,55 to censure 
reprisals by Crown Forces and investigate the “causes, nature, and extent of reprisals” in 
Ireland.  This motion was overwhelmingly rejected.56 The Government argued that 
systematic reprisals were not taking place and any violence committed by soldiers and 
police in Ireland was accidental or justified.57 However, the shooting at Croke Park 
stimulated another call for inquiry, akin to that conducted by the Hunter Commission, 
which would consider the events of 21st November 1920 specifically, alongside other 
reported episodes of violence committed against Irish civilians and their property. Even 
so, the Government still insisted that a public inquiry into the actions of the RIC and 
Auxiliaries was not necessary, for the same reasons an investigation had been rejected a 
month prior. Greenwood called some of the reported cases of reprisals "hideous and 
monstrous falsehoods" and "simply untrue" in his refusal, and thus a public 
investigation into cases of violence in Ireland against civilians, including Croke Park, 
was denied.58 Conservative MPs such as John Pennefather supported the Government's 
stance and their refusal to hold an inquiry in the aftermath of Croke Park. Pennefather 
argued that an inquiry would be essentially pointless as evidence could not be 
guaranteed as impartial. 59 Thus, Government representations of the events, despite the 
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demands of Irish nationalist MPs, Independent Liberals and the Labour Party, were not 
subject to scrutiny through a public investigation. 
Instead, two military courts of inquiry in lieu of inquests were held within days of the 
Croke Park Massacre. They commenced on 23rd November under the instruction of the 
commander of the British forces in Dublin, Major-General Boyd, and were held at the 
Mater Hospital and the Jarvis Street Hospital, Dublin.60 They were held with the purpose 
of "taking medical evidence, evidence of identification, and other evidence that may be 
brought forward"61 regarding the deaths of the civilians killed. Evidence was taken 
anonymously from thirty-five witnesses who were either part of the RIC and Auxiliary 
forces, or who had been spectators at the football match.62 The nature of the inquiries 
was very different to that held by the Hunter Commission in the Punjab. They were 
military inquiries held in a closed court without presence of the media. The proceedings 
were never published and the records of the proceedings were kept in closed files. 
However, in November 1999 folder WO 35/88 was released by the Public Records 
Office.63 The proceedings of these military courts of inquiry are now accessible to 
historians, but they have only been utilised by a few.64  
The individual witness statements in file WO 35/88 show that the testimonies provided 
to both inquiries contradicted each other on several occasions.65 Nonetheless, David 
Leeson has conducted a thorough analysis of the witness statements which builds up a 
convincing picture of the sequence of events at Croke Park. He concludes that the Black 
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and Tans were not fired on first, that no weapons were found on any of the civilians 
searched, or at the scene, and that Crown Forces rushed in to Croke Park and started 
shooting without provocation.  This contradicts the Government’s contemporary public 
portrayal of events, which Leeson labels "disingenuous"66 Leeson's conclusion 
highlights that evidence collected during both inquiries had the potential to discredit 
the official representation of the massacre. Both inquiries maintained that the firing was 
"carried out without orders and exceeded the demands of the situation,”67 and Major 
Boyd’s personal conclusions dubbed the firing “indiscriminate, and unjustifiable”.68  
Major E L Mills, commander of the Auxiliary Division contingent at Croke Park, sent a 
report to the Adjutant of the Auxiliary Division the day after the massacre that would 
have brought the Government view into further disrepute. This report can also be found 
in file WO 35/88. Mills explained in his report that the police were “excited and out of 
hand.” He stated: “We found no arms on any of the people attending the match… I did 
not see any need for any firing at all”.69 This report was sent prior to the Government 
issuing its final statement on the massacre. Mills’ version of events clearly contradicts 
the initial two statements presented to the public and reported in the press, and, as we 
will see, it contradicted the third statement even further. The report was received by the 
Adjutant General, but was not produced at the courts of inquiry. Even if this report had 
been considered by the inquiry, it still would have remained hidden for as long as the 
files remained closed. 
Unlike with the Hunter Commission Inquiry, the results of this investigation were in no 
way used to inform, reinforce or amend the Government's construction of events. 
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Throughout the investigation into the Punjab Disturbances, the Secretary of State for 
India urged Parliament, the press, and the people, to reserve judgement until the 
commission had completed their investigation. He maintained that an official decision 
and a course of action would not be made until the Hunter Commission had drawn their 
conclusions.70 Accordingly, General Dyer was not censured until after the reports were 
published, over a year after he had ordered his forces to fire on the crowd. In the Irish 
case however, the Government immediately provided their official representation, then 
proceeded to conceal and disregard the results of the subsequent inquiries which 
ultimately exposed this version as false. Instead, the Chief Secretary of Ireland 
continued to uphold the Government stance, which had been constructed through three 
official statements by the time the inquiry concluded. Unlike the findings of the Hunter 
Inquiry, which were of use to the British Government, the evidence collected by the 
Mater Street Hospital and Jarvis Street Hospital inquiries, was not. The court files make 
it clear that the findings of the inquiry could have completely discredited the 
Government view. It is thus not surprising that the results of the inquiry remained 
closed for almost 80 years,71 despite pressure from the left and centre in the following 
months for the findings to be released.72  This secrecy had been made possible by the 
Chief Secretary successfully rejecting the requests from the Opposition for an 
investigation that was public. 
 
 
                                                          
70 British Library, IOR/L/PJ/6/1641, File 7912, Protests from UK borough councils and other 
organisations against the shooting of an unarmed crowd of Indians by troops at Amritsar, Dec 1919-Jun 
1920. 
71 Leeson, 'Death in the Afternoon: The Croke Park Massacre, 21 November 1920', p. 43. 
72 House of Commons Debate, 02 December 1920, vol. 135 cc. 1419-20. 
42 
 
The Government View and its Defence in Parliament: Amritsar 
A Cabinet Memorandum from June 1920 informed that General Dyer had been censured 
by the Army Council, and thus the British Government, and forcibly retired from the 
Indian Army. It also stated that these decisions were based on the conclusions of the 
Hunter Commission Inquiry.73 The official stance was made clear and over a year after 
the Amritsar Massacre, a decision on who was to blame had finally been made. The 
British Government condemned General Dyer’s actions and held him solely responsible 
for the shooting at Amritsar. 
However, whilst the Government maintained throughout the Amritsar controversy that 
their decision to censure General Dyer was based on the reports of the Hunter Inquiry, 
and Montagu had urged that judgement be reserved until the inquiry had been 
completed,74 it appears that the Government's stance and the intention to censure 
General Dyer were to some extent already being formulated prior to the publication of 
the Hunter reports. In December 1919 – six months before publication of the reports, 
the British Prime Minister was already placing sole blame on General Dyer, 
representing the massacre as an isolated event, and attempting to divert any potential 
accountability away from the imperial administration. Lloyd George described Dyer to 
the House of Commons as “the principal actor”, stating that “the thing must be put 
right.”75 The Prime Minister was already establishing Dyer as the key perpetrator who 
should be held accountable. He used emotive phrases such as “bleeding to death” and 
“heap of dead and dying” in an early attempt to get MPs into the anti-Dyer camp. More 
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importantly however, he claimed that “there has never been anything like it before in 
English history.” 76  This is probably the first instance in which the singularity argument, 
the argument upheld by the British Government throughout the Parliamentary debates 
in 1920, can be noted in official public discourse. Thus, despite the claim that the 
Government’s decision to censure Dyer was based on the Commission’s 
recommendations, in December 1919, it is clear that the Prime Minister at least, was 
already willing to charge General Dyer with sole responsibility for the massacre. 
The Government were under pressure from local councils, trade unions and other 
organisations across Britain throughout the course of the Hunter Inquiry, as these 
groups were expressing protest against the Amritsar affair prior to the Commission 
reports being published. Perhaps this pressure may have encouraged the Government 
to find blame in a singular culprit outside of the administration early on. Letters to 
Montagu dating back to December 1919 were calling for the persons responsible to be 
punished, and the reputation of the Empire to be restored.77 For example, a letter to 
Montagu from the Borough of Greenwich Town Clerk demanded that the Government 
“bring the culprits to justice, and to redeem as much as possible the name and honour of 
this country". The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom urged "the 
recall of General Dyer", and the Rhonda Miners' Federation went as far to say on 18th 
December 1919, that "the Officer responsible for this atrocity should be brought to trial 
for murder."78 The responses to these letters maintained that the Government were 
waiting for the results of the Hunter Inquiry before making a judgement on the incident 
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and issuing punishment.79  However, as demonstrated by Lloyd George's speech to the 
House of Commons, the victims and perpetrators of the Amritsar Massacre and the 
course of action necessary to relieve the British administration of blame, were to some 
extent already decided. This pressure may nevertheless have reaffirmed to the 
Government that identifying a sole culprit was a necessity.  
The findings of the Hunter Inquiry and the way the Government pinned the blame on 
Dyer angered many politicians and the conservative press, who strongly objected to 
Dyer’s treatment. The main objectors, their defence of Dyer, and their criticism of the 
Government view will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  The extremely contentious 
nature of the Amritsar affair led to demands from both pro-Dyer and anti-Dyer groups 
for a special parliamentary debate. This debate was held on 8th July 1920, and in it the 
Government had to defend their representation of, and response to, the Amritsar 
Massacre. The Government's portrayal of Dyer as the sole perpetrator of an atrocious 
but a-typical event was central to this debate.  As well as this, the case of General Dyer 
instigated a broader discussion over how Britain should maintain control of its empire.  
Montagu, as Secretary of State for India, opened the debate on behalf of the 
Government, arguing that Dyer's actions were based on “the doctrine of terrorism”. 
Rather than linking the censure of Dyer to the findings of the Hunter Commission 
however, Montagu immediately raised the broader question of the nature of the British 
Raj. He asked the House: “Are you going to keep your hold upon India by terrorism, 
racial humiliation, and subordination, and frightfulness, or are you going to rest it upon 
the goodwill, and the growing goodwill, of the people of your Indian Empire?” 80 This 
question of whether or not Britain should rule its empire by the sword remained 
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significant throughout the Amritsar debate, and is also seen throughout discussions on 
the Irish question. Montagu argued the British rule in India and across the Empire could 
only be preserved through partnership. He stated that domination would lead to the 
British being “driven out of the country by the united opinion of the civilised world.” 
Moreover, Montagu implored that if Britain wished to uphold the Indian Empire 
through “justice and partnership” then General Dyer had to be condemned by the 
British Government. Montagu believed in prolonging British rule in India by acting “in 
accordance with the canons of modern love of liberty and democracy”, not with 
“callousness about Indian honour and Indian life.”81  Montagu promoted the idea of a 
‘Britishness’ that encapsulated collaboration, respect, and peace, rather than militarism. 
Jon Lawrence explains that during imperial crisis, many politicians peddled the notion 
that the British were a peaceable people who embodied values of justice and civility. 
Here, Montagu was asking the House to conform to this post-war national identity that 
was frequently promoted in public discourse in the immediate inter-war years. 
Winston Churchill was the next politician to address the house on behalf of the 
Government as Secretary of State for War. However, Churchill’s argument focused 
explicitly on the sole culpability of General Dyer. The singularity argument, first 
introduced in the Commons by Lloyd George in 1919, is clearly promoted here in 
Churchill’s defence of the Government. Churchill maintained that the Amritsar Massacre 
was “an episode which appears to me to be without precedent or parallel in the modern 
history of the British Empire… It is an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event 
which stands in singular and sinister isolation.”82 By placing the blame solely on Dyer 
and stressing the exceptional character of the event, the Amritsar Massacre could be 
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reduced to a cruel error of judgment by one man, and not seen as a direct consequence 
of the inherently oppressive character of the Raj, or part of a broader problem regarding 
the nature of British colonial rule.  
Furthermore, in order to further shield the Empire from scrutiny, Churchill 
continuously attempted to frame British rule as a force of justice and partnership, 
particularly in comparison to other global powers. He stated that only governments 
who have stolen power through violence have to resort to terrorism to maintain 
control. Churchill claimed that “such ideas are absolutely foreign to the British way of 
doing business.” His representation of the righteous British character in contrast to 
“foreign” unlawful and violent character of ‘others’ is clear. Dyer had to be censured if 
this perception of British character was to be preserved. He insisted that “we have to 
make it absolutely clear, some way or another, that this is not the British way of doing 
business”. 83 Churchill’s argument foreshadows those of historians such as Charles 
Townsend, who insist on the a-typical nature of the Amritsar Massacre and that the 
Empire avoided excessive violence.  
A Cabinet Memorandum from the Foreign Office produced in January 1920 stated: 
"Recent events in Ireland and Egypt, together with the reports of the evidence heard by 
Lord Hunter's enquiry into the Punjab riots arouse voluminous discussion. The general 
opinion is that these events have openly exposed the barbarity of Imperialism."84 
Churchill was highly aware of this unfavourable exposure. Hence, the Secretary of State 
for War and the British Government had to demonstrate an aversion to "barbarity" or 
"terrorism". Thus, for the sake of preserving the reputation of the Empire and its 
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legitimacy, Churchill had to assert that the governing of India was rooted in partnership 
as Montagu implored that it should be, and Dyer had to be censured. 
Conservative Party Leader and Leader of the House, Andrew Bonar Law, recognised the 
"difficulties" faced by General Dyer, but also argued on behalf of the Coalition 
Government that General Dyer's censure was an appropriate consequence of his 
actions. He argued that Dyer’s actions were wrong and thus "the government of this 
country and of India is bound to declare that, in its opinion, it was wrong."85 He 
condemned the fact that Dyer did not give prior warning before firing and continued 
shooting unnecessarily, as highlighted in the Hunter Commission Reports. Bonar Law 
closed the debate by asserting that Britain needed to avoid action that gave any 
potential enemies in India "the right to say that we are treating Indians less fairly than 
we treat other British subjects."86 Again, the Government’s agenda became clear; the 
representation of the Empire as fair and just must be preserved, and thus Dyer must be 
condemned. 
The House of Commons debate ended with a vote in favour of the Government, but it is 
important to note that 120 Unionists voted against them.87 This demonstrated a serious 
lack of support for the censure of General Dyer among the Coalition Government's 
majority party. Whilst Montagu aimed to present a united front, it is clear that 
disagreement over the official stance was present. Additionally, it was not only the 
House of Commons in which the ‘official view’ of the Amritsar Massacre required 
defending. The Government’s representation and censure of General Dyer was also 
scrutinised by the House of Lords. Viscount Finlay, who had been Lord Chancellor of 
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Great Britain until January 1919, moved a motion of censure to the House of Lords on 
19th July 1920 that stated: "This House deplores the conduct of the case of General Dyer 
as unjust to that officer." The debate resulted in a vote against the Government, with 
129 votes cast in support of the motion.88 The right-wing defenders of Dyer who voted 
against the Government will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Despite this majority sentiment in the Lords, however, several of the Lords did defend 
the Government stance. Language regarding the righteousness of the British rule was 
also prevalent throughout their defence, as seen in the House of Commons. For example, 
the Secretary of State for Colonies, Viscount Milner,89 argued that Dyer’s conduct at 
Amritsar constituted a policy “which no civilised Government, least of all the British 
Government with its high standards of justice and humanity, could do otherwise than 
repudiate.”90 Similarly, former Liberal MP Lord Buckmaster,91 maintained that if force 
across the Empire is deemed necessary, “its only sanction is the administration of 
justice, and the welfare and benefit of the people whom it rules.”92 The Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Earl Curzon of Kedleston and former Viceroy of India,93 
concurred. He insisted that should the Lords vote in favour of General Dyer, they “shall 
lower our own standards of justice and humanity” and “debase the currency of our 
national honour.”94 Again, the idea of the civility and justice of Britishness and the 
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British Empire is dominant, insisting that Britishness was based on a moral superiority 
that had to be preserved.  
This idea of moral superiority and the virtuous nature of British rule was further 
accentuated through a comparison with Germany made by Viscount Milner. He asked: 
“Does anyone really doubt that Prussian methods of repression are more effective… 
than our milder British methods?” 95 This statement also equated Dyer’s actions with 
Prussianism, in line with the Hunter Commission Reports and other parliamentary 
rhetoric. During this time of imperial crisis, the British strived to portray themselves as 
peaceful people who ruled their empire in a fair and nonviolent way, in contrast to other 
European powers, particularly Germany. This representation of the British and their 
empire as 'peaceable' attempted to distinguish them as a legitimate and just imperial 
authority in a post-war milieu where anti-imperialist ideologies were rapidly 
expanding. This tactic was also used in debates on violence in Ireland. In addition, 
comparing Dyer's actions to Prussianism also employed residual British nationalist 
sentiments from the First World War in order to garner further support and reinforce 
the Government's argument. 
This view of Britain as a moral force and protector only reinforced the lens of 
“paternalistic” imperialism through which Indians were often viewed.96 For example, 
Lord Meston,97 who had been the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra 
and Oudh from 1912 to 1918, maintained that “British traditions of fair dealing and of 
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humanity and justice to weaker people were broken”.98 He promoted the idea that 
British traditions were supposedly beneficial to “weaker peoples”, or at least they were 
until General Dyer ‘broke’ them. This notion also resonated throughout the defence of 
the Government and the Empire given by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall 
Thomas Davidson. He stated: 
It is commonplace, a truism, to say that there is nothing greater in the life of our 
Empire than the story of our rule in India. It is a story of great things greatly 
done, wise leaders and rulers growing constantly in experience and knowledge 
of peoples alien to their own, among whom they were sent to rule, using that 
gathered experience and knowledge with far-seeing statesmanship, with great 
sympathy, with stimulating leadership, and sometimes fatherly care.99  
The Archbishop’s use of the term “fatherly care” is a good example of paternalist 
imperialism, as Derek Sayer has discussed in his article.100 The Archbishop went on to 
hark back to justifications of imperialism as a ‘civilising mission’.  He argued that 
Britain, as a moral Christian force, had been able to “promote the intellectual 
emancipation of the Indian peoples” and had been working to change “their habits of 
thought, their religious ideal and their moral level.” Thus, like Lords Meston, 
Buckmaster and Milner, and like Churchill, the Archbishop’s argument in support of the 
Government was based on maintaining the supposed moral greatness of the British 
Empire. In this context, General Dyer’s actions had to be condemned. 
It is also striking that several officials who defended the Government stance did so by 
requesting that members of both Houses consider what their reaction would have been 
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had the Amritsar Massacre happened elsewhere. Conservative MP and Lord Chancellor, 
Frederick Smith, 1st Earl of Birkenhead, argued:  
Suppose this assembly had consisted of Irishmen, or suppose the Canadian 
Government were dealing with the revolutionary mob which overpowered 
Winnipeg and held it for days, or that authorities were dealing with the mobs 
which in Glasgow defeated law and order - who is here bold enough to defend 
him if General Dyer went to Glasgow, or Winnipeg, or Belfast, and shot down, as 
long as he had shot left in the rifles of his soldiers, 300 or 400 persons? No 
one!101  
Birkenhead contended that if Dyer’s actions would not be considered acceptable in 
Ireland, Canada or Scotland, then they should not be considered acceptable in India. 
Inherent in his argument was the suggestion that those who argued in favour of actions 
like Dyer’s when they took place in India but opposed them when they were directed 
against white people were opponents of the “true view” of the Empire, which 
supposedly ensured that any citizen, “whatever his colour and creed, whatever his 
geographical location, can look to justice.”102 Lord Sumner, John Hamilton, who had 
been a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, combated this argument by 
insisting  that “any part of our country- in Limerick, in Glasgow, or anywhere else” was 
too civilised to experience violent disturbances similar to those seen in the Punjab, and 
thus Dyer’s actions would never be necessitated there.103 This assertion is surprising, 
given that the Irish War for Independence was well underway. However, the Marquess 
of Crewe retorted that some MPs in the House considered the Indian life “less 
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important” than the European. He exclaimed: “For "India" read "Ireland… for "Amritsar" 
read "Limerick"… who will say that it would be wise, or right, or possible to open fire on 
a crowd of that kind listening to a speech… you must take the Irish parallel and see what 
would be said supposing indiscriminate shooting took place in the same way in an Irish 
town."104 Of course, firing on an unarmed crowd was in fact soon to become a focus of 
attention in relation to Ireland. 
 
The Government View and its Defence in Parliament: Croke Park 
The Government representation of the Croke Park Massacre had to an extent already 
been constructed and made known to the British public by the 22nd November 1920. 
The first two official statements had been presented prior to the commencement of the 
courts of inquiry, and set the tone for the final Government account of the shooting. As 
Leeson explains, all three of these official statements “were essentially similar, but each 
was more evasive than its predecessor on the subject of civilian casualties.” 105 The 
initial reports admitted to the police firing at the football field, “killing 10 and wounding 
others”106, but the third report indicated that it was a stampede of the crowd that was 
predominantly responsible for the casualties. This third and final official statement was 
presented by Sir Hamar Greenwood to the House of Commons on the 23rd November, 
and remained the Government’s stance on the massacre, despite being consistently 
challenged by the press and opposition MP’s. The Chief Secretary stated that the 
account had “been compiled from the report made by police and military, after very 
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careful investigation."107 However, the courts of inquiry investigating Croke Park had 
only begun that day, and did not conclude until December 1920.108  
The final Government statement was constructed around two dominant themes: That 
the crowd at Croke Park were in some way criminal, and that the crowd were somehow 
responsible. First of all, the statement vilified the spectators by maintaining that among 
them were Sinn Feiners who had conducted the assassinations of British officers that 
morning. Greenwood argued that it was "their presence and their efforts to escape” that 
caused “fatal consequence to a number of innocent people"109, rather than the 
indiscriminate firing on the crowd by the RIC. The account criminalised them further by 
falsely stating that “a considerable number of men among the football crowd were 
carrying arms” and that a large number of these weapons were found at the scene.  
Greenwood insisted this was a point “proven beyond doubt”,110 although evidence from 
Mills’ report and the courts of inquiry suggest otherwise.111 The Chief Secretary also 
maintained that the police were fired upon first, again, criminalising the spectators, as 
well as attempting to justify any shooting that was “returned” by the authorities.  
Lastly, the third statement emphasised that casualties were predominantly caused by a 
stampede. It explained that during attempts to escape, “a number of people were 
crushed.”112 However, medical evidence from both courts explained that most victims 
died as a result of bullet wounds. Still, the Government persisted with this version of 
events and continued to divert blame onto the crowd. Greenwood closed the statement 
by explicitly renouncing any accountability on behalf of the British authorities, and 
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maintained that responsibility "rests entirely upon those assassins whose existence is a 
constant menace to all law-abiding persons in Ireland."113 By referring to these 
"culprits" as assassins, he is again associating the crowd with the assassinations 
committed against British officers on the morning of 21st November. 
The final version of events was upheld with the intention of freeing the Crown Forces 
and thus the British Government from all accountability. This is comparable to the 
Government’s underlying intentions to protect the imperial administration from 
scrutiny via the censure of General Dyer, although no single scapegoat was available to 
blame in the case of Croke Park. As with Amritsar, the Government view was challenged 
by British politicians and by reports in the press, so it became necessary to discuss the 
Croke Park Massacre in Parliament. This instigated a fresh debate in the House of 
Commons over the broader issue of reprisals in Ireland at this time. During this debate 
held on 24th November 1920, the Chief Secretary was forced to defend the Government 
stance on the massacre, as well as to address the broader issue of the use violence 
against civilians in Ireland. The motion put forward by the Leader of the Liberal Party 
who sat in opposition to the coalition Government, Herbert Asquith, stated that the 
House “deplores and condemns the action of the Executive in attempting to repress 
crime by methods of terrorism and reprisals which involve the lives and property of the 
innocent.”114 This was a direct challenge to the Government's portrayal of Croke Park, 
and to its broader representation of the nature of British rule in Ireland at this time. 
After Asquith's critical speech that argued that reprisals were happening, were 
deliberate, and were systematic, Greenwood rose to begin the Government’s defence. 
He immediately brought attention to the events of the morning of Bloody Sunday. He 
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stated: “I want, first, to say to the house that all those wounded officers whose murder 
was attempted on Sunday last are progressing favourably.” He went on to describe the 
assault on British officers conducted on the morning of the 21st November 1920 as a 
“massacre”, and “one of the most horrible tragedies in the history of Ireland or of the 
world.”115 He was trying to keep focus on the assassinations of British officers, rather 
than give attention to the victims of Croke Park, or the victims of other reprisals 
committed by the RIC. He described the assassinations as "cruel and savage massacres… 
cold-blooded and carefully planned atrocities", committed by an "organised band of 
assassins". He then charged the mornings assassinations as "one of the most awful 
tragedies in the history of our Empire".116 Throughout the debate Greenwood 
persistently recalled the various attacks on British police and soldiers that had occurred 
so far throughout the Irish War for Independence, and attempted to avoid discussing 
the Irish civilians who had suffered at the hand of the British authorities. Moreover, 
when Greenwood did give focus to the crimes committed by Crown Forces, he refused, 
on behalf of the Government, to accept any blame. He stated:  
The consequential outrages that follow from a state of civil war such as exists in 
Ireland are not outrages for which the government or any government has 
responsibility. The responsibility is on the shoulders of those who, by a method 
of murder, are attempting to set up an independent Ireland.117 
Consistent with his final statement about the massacre at Croke Park, the Chief 
Secretary insisted that blame should rest on those who supposedly have defied British 
authority, not British troops or the administration. 
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Furthermore, shielding the Government from blame required Greenwood to 
unequivocally defend the RIC against the accusation that reprisals were deliberate and 
taking place in Ireland on a systematic scale. Similarly to the Amritsar Massacre, the 
Croke Park Massacre had to be presented as atypical, unlike Amritsar however, no one 
person could be scapegoated in order to avert criticism from the Government.  Hence, 
Greenwood needed to find justification for any violence against civilians that had 
already occurred, and in turn defend and justify the actions of the Crown Forces at 
Croke Park. In order to do this, Greenwood maintained the two initial lines of argument 
that were dominant in the previous official statements: That the victims were in some 
way criminal and that they were ultimately to blame. However, he also adopted a new 
line of defence in an attempt to exonerate British forces and thus the Government from 
further scrutiny over the frequent and indiscriminate violence that had been reported 
from Ireland.  
The Chief Secretary’s new line of defence continually framed the RIC and the Auxiliary 
Division as heroes to Britain and the Empire, as well as the true victims of violence in 
Ireland. Greenwood lionised the British forces by describing them as "the cream of the 
ex-service", most of which he claims have "decorations for valour".118 He stirred the 
memory of the Easter Rising in attempt to represent the RIC as heroes through history, 
arguing that they "helped to save this country during the rebellion of 1916".119 
Moreover, in an attempt to justify imperial violence, specifically burning of creameries, 
Greenwood depicted an ambush at a creamery in Kerry. In his narrative of the attack, 
Irish nationalists were vilified to the extreme and the RIC and Auxiliary forces were 
persistently portrayed as heroes. He explained that Crown Forces went to the house of 
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the manager of the creamery from which they had just been fired upon. He stated that 
"they found a wounded Sinn Feiner inside, and naturally, being chivalrous British 
soldiers, they did not touch the house".120 The notion of the "British way of doing 
business”121 as recalled by Churchill during the Dyer debate, resonated in this portrayal 
of “chivalrous British soldiers” showing mercy and using minimum force.  
Greenwood described another incident in which Crown Forces came under attack in an 
attempt to present them as both disciplined heroes and victims of violence. He 
explained:  
The Auxiliary Division found one of its members with his arms trussed up behind 
him, tied together, who had been brutally murdered, and drowned in the river 
Liffey. There was no reprisal! How many of us could have stood the strain as 
well?... there is no case in the history of our empire, with all its stress and 
struggle, in which discipline has been so sternly maintained under such frightful 
provocation. 122  
Greenwood also described a reprisal that occurred in Dublin, reciting how "the men 
collapsed and fell down crying", how their officer had "been murdered at very close 
range", and how "they were all crying and were so upset" and how "the men became 
mad".123 Greenwood insisted that after this event, only a few windows were smashed, to 
which Joseph Devlin MP, exclaimed: "Nonsense!"124 Through these stories, the Chief 
Secretary was attempting to demonstrate to the House how the Crown Forces were 
strong and disciplined in the face of “frightful provocation”, but also how the situation in 
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Ireland and the violence of the IRA could on occasion lead to some retaliation; but this 
retaliation was understandable.  
The Chief Secretary for Ireland closed his defence of the Government by asking the 
House: "Who is for Ireland and the Empire, and who is for the assassin?"125 In the 
context of imperial crisis, this was a shrewd move. Fear of the empire’s deterioration 
among right wing was very real at this time. Greenwood explained that there was an 
organised conspiracy in Ireland, "which has as its object the smashing of the British 
Empire”. He argued: "After the experience of Sunday, how anyone can suggest that the 
Irish Republican Army is incapable of tackling Manchester and Liverpool".126 The Chief 
Secretary was calling on this fear to validate his policy in Ireland, and garner support for 
taking control in Ireland with a firm hand. Paranoia over the end of empire was also 
visible in the right wing reaction to Amritsar. Notably, this paranoia is not visible in the 
official position on Amritsar. This is arguably due to the fact that the situation in India 
was much less serious than that in Ireland at this time. Ireland was in open rebellion, at 
war, with the intention of overthrowing British rule; India was not, and had not been in 
April 1919, despite cries from British and Irish Unionists that the Punjab Disturbances 
had been a revolutionary uprising potentially equal to the one occurring in Ireland. 
Conservative politician, Lieut. Colonel Croft,127 who strongly opposed Irish home rule, 
was next to speak in defence of the Government over the situation in Ireland. He 
charged those who criticised the actions such as those taken at Croke Park and intended 
to vote against the Government, were in fact censuring “all the ranks of the Army and 
the Royal Irish Constabulary in Ireland." Similarly to Montagu's speech on Amritsar, 
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Croft made suggestions on how the British should rule Ireland. In contrast to Montagu, 
however, Croft insisted that maintaining control in Ireland required a firm hand, rather 
than collaboration and partnership.  He upheld the Government construction of the 
Crown Forces as both heroes and victims, insisting that “our soldiers and police are 
suffering from a state of affairs far worse than any war." Similarly to Greenwood, Croft 
described instances of the IRC being assassinated. He asked the House to "imagine the 
position of these soldiers and police in these terror stricken areas", and called for them 
"to back these men up".128 This notion of "backing your men" also resonated throughout 
the pro-Dyer argument during the Amritsar controversy. As well as this, Croft showed 
his extremist position by stating that he condoned reprisals against civilians, believing 
that: “the soldiers by hitting back have at any rate put a certain amount of fear in the 
enemies of the law and order in Ireland".129 This notion of the legitimacy of striking fear 
in the innocent in an attempt to punish the guilty had also been advanced by Dyer's 
defenders in 1920, when they refused to censure his attempt to produce "a moral effect" 
across the Punjab. 
John Pennefather, Conservative MP for Liverpool Kirkdale, also mounted a nationalistic 
defence of the British Government, labelling those in Parliament who reprimanded the 
actions of the Crown Forces and who questioned the accounts given by the Government 
with criticism, as "defenders of the Sinn Fein".130 He argued that criticism of British 
soldiers and police was unfair, framing them as victims of parliamentary scrutiny. He 
claimed: 
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Some members of this House have ‘Black and Tan’ on the brain. You hear them 
gibe repeatedly at those ex-service men, and suggest, some of them - it is a 
terrible thing - that those ex-service men, those British soldiers who are now in 
Ireland in the police or in the military forces, are really inhumane brutes. 131  
Pennefather found the criticism of the British forces in Ireland abhorrent, and accused 
the House of “blackening their reputation”. 132 He repeatedly highlighted that they were 
British ex-servicemen who had fought in the First World War, and that their treatment 
by the Opposition was thus especially unjust and objectionable. 
Finally, Liberal Coalition MPs, Lieut. Colonel J. Ward and Major General Seely rose to 
defend the Government.133  Like Croft, Colonel Ward asked the House to ‘back your 
men’. Ward emphasised the necessity to 'support the man on the spot', arguing that "it 
is all very well" to decide what should have been done afterwards, but you have to 
"decide in the moment".134 At the same time, both MPs denied that the Crown Forces 
could have committed the deliberate attacks on civilians of which they were accused, 
including the attack at Croke Park. Ward insisted: “It is impossible for an English soldier 
or a British soldier, in whichever way you describe him, to perform the atrocities that 
has been alleged against him.”135 The notion of the righteous British character is again 
central here. The fact that these soldiers were "English" or "British" seemed proof 
enough that the "accusations" surrounding reprisals were unfounded, and the fact these 
soldiers were British, makes their (supposed) victimisation even more preposterous to 
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Ward, as it had been for Pennefather. ‘Britishness’ also fed into the further lionisation of 
the Crown Forces. Ward stated: "Of all the heroic figures the world has ever seen I think 
the most heroic, the most chivalrous, the most honourable is the ordinary British 
Tommy".136 This does raise the question, why did the Coalition Government have little 
problem criticising Dyer. The difference in the context in which the Amritsar Massacre 
took place is relevant in that Ireland was in a state of civil war where the Government 
had to stand up for its own side, India was not. Additionally, Dyer was a military 
commander who had ordered the British troops to fire. This enabled the Government to 
frame it as a single atrocity committed by a single man. The Croke Park Massacre, 
however, was another example in a long list of reprisals committed by the same police 
and military forces, and no single scapegoat was available in the Irish case as no officer 
had given the order to fire. Ilahi explains: "The entire system of law and order would 
have to be called into question if the Government could not justify the shooting to the 
public."137 
The Government and its supporters defended the RIC and Auxiliary Division by 
emphasising that they were under constant attack by the Irish Republican Army, and by 
framing them as heroes for remaining in Ireland and fighting for peace. They argued 
that these “gallant soldiers” remained disciplined despite the difficulties they faced, and 
that reprisals were not deliberate or systematic but "in some cases they were 
completely justified." 138 They presented the British police and soldiers as heroes and 
the true victims of the conflict, as well as the victims of criticism from opposition MPs. 
Through this representation, the Government hoped that criticism could be averted 
regarding their policy in Ireland and episodes of imperial violence such as the Croke 
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Park Massacre. However, as will be explained in Chapter 4, the Government continued 
to face challenges from the Labour Party in Britain over their response to, and portrayal 
of, the shootings at Croke Park. Nevertheless, the Chief Secretary continued to maintain 
to the House that “the firing by the Crown forces was fully justified in the exceptional 
circumstances of the situation."139  
Ultimately, in the aftermath of both Croke Park and Amritsar, the Government 
responded in a way they thought would be most beneficial to British rule in India and 
Ireland, and their position in Britain. This required the Government in both cases to 
avoid culpability. However, in response to Croke Park and the other reprisals in Ireland, 
the Government and its supporters could not allocate blame to a single perpetrator such 
as General Dyer. Thus the Government fully defended the Crown Forces in the aftermath 
of Croke Park, framing them as both heroes and the victims. They attempted to justify 
their actions by criminalising the spectators, and blaming the deaths of civilians on the 
crowd. Instead of placing full blame on one man, as in the case of Amritsar, the 
Government blamed the excessive and indiscriminate force inflicted by British soldiers 
and police in Ireland on the Irish. 
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Chapter 3 
The Right-Wing Defence of General Dyer 
 
The Government response to the Amritsar Massacre was heavily criticised by British 
and Irish Unionists in Parliament, who defended General Dyer throughout the Amritsar 
controversy. This chapter will address this right-wing reaction to General Dyer’s 
censure by the British Government. As explained in chapter 1, existing scholarship has 
given significantly more attention to the right-wing response to the Amritsar Massacre 
than that of the Left. One reason for this is that much of the pro-Dyer historiography 
that has emerged since the 1960s,1 mirrored, or is rooted, in the defence of Dyer that 
was constructed by conservative contemporaries in 1919 and 1920. Brian Bond, for 
example, argued that General Dyer was doing his duty to suppress a widespread 
rebellion that was raging across the Punjab.2 Alfred Draper argues that he was "thrown 
to the Wolves" for carrying out this duty.3 These notions of Dyer 'doing his duty', 'saving 
the Punjab’, and being "thrown to the wolves because of it"4  were dominant throughout 
pro-Dyer political discourse in the aftermath of the atrocity. Another reason for this 
attention could also be because the right-wing reaction to General Dyer's censure 
challenged the British Government, as highlighted across existing historiography on 
Amritsar. This was especially significant as many of the Government's challengers came 
from within the Coalition itself, which was composed of a heavy Unionist majority. 
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Nonetheless, this previous historiography has done little to demonstrate the 
connections between the right-wing defence of General Dyer and the Government 
defence of the Croke Park Massacre. Ilahi discusses how the situation in Ireland in 1920 
influenced the defence of Dyer, a point which will be maintained here, but this chapter 
will also consider in depth the specific discourse used to construct Dyer's defence, and 
how this paralleled with the language used to excuse the actions of the Crown Forces 
after Croke Park. This has yet to be highlighted by existing scholarship. First of all, the 
reactions of right-wing politicians will be addressed by considering the arguments 
delivered during the key Parliamentary debates. The reporting of the Amritsar 
controversy in a number of conservative newspapers will then be considered. The 
defence of General Dyer by right-wing politicians and the press will then be discussed in 
relation to the Croke Park Massacre, and connections and comparisons will be made.  
 
Defending Dyer in Parliament 
The pro-Dyer camp strongly contested the official portrayal of General Dyer as the 
perpetrator to blame for the shooting at Amritsar. Thus, a defence was constructed by 
right-wing politicians who contested this official representation of events. Three lines of 
argument can be identified throughout political discourse which attempted to defend 
and justify Dyer's actions. The first two foreshadowed the perspectives of the pro-Dyer 
historiography, claiming that General Dyer was a hero and portraying him as the true 
victim in the aftermath of Amritsar. The third insisted that the Indian civilians were to 
blame for being fired upon and attempted to demonise the Indian victims. These notions 
were upheld by right-wing politicians during the House of Commons debate that was 
held on 8th July 1920 and the House of Lords debate which convened 10 days later. 
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Sir Edward Carson was the key protagonist who had sought to defend General Dyer to 
the House of Commons. Carson was Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) which 
was formally linked to the Conservative Party in Britain, and whose MPs took the 
Conservative Whip at Westminster.5 As leader of the UUP, Carson’s view of Ireland 
served to motivate his support of Dyer. Unionist MPs such as himself likened the growth 
of nationalism in Ireland to that in India, and for Carson, how the Government 
responded to threats in India indicated their ability to maintain their hold over Ireland.6 
According to Carson and other pro-Dyer right-wing politicians, it was men like General 
Dyer and their harsh and decisive action against any threat to authority that were 
needed in Ireland, just as they were needed in India. Hence, the war in Ireland in 1920 
influenced the Dyer debate. Historians Ilahi and Sayer also recognise this “Irish subtext”, 
as did contemporaries. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Liberal MP Frederick Guest 
noted the significance of Edward Carson, with his Irish connection, leading the defence 
of General Dyer.7 Indeed, the Irish influence was significant, and an example of how the 
context of imperial crisis affected the right-wing response. Ilahi clarifies: "It was no 
coincidence that almost all those who voted against Dyer's censure were Irish 
Unionists."8 
Carson was first to criticise the Government’s management of the Amritsar crisis during 
the Commons debate. He began his speech by framing Dyer as a British hero, “a gallant 
officer of 34 years’ service – without a blemish on his record.”9 This image of Dyer as a 
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“gallant officer” was continuously promoted by the pro-Dyer camp. Central to this 
heroisation of Dyer was the understanding that a planned large scale rebellion was 
occurring at the time of the Amritsar Massacre, which vindicated the shooting. Carson 
used phrases such as “seething with rebellion and anarchy” and “precursor to a 
revolution”10 to try to excuse Dyer’s decision to fire on the crowd. Conservative MP, 
William Joynson-Hicks,11 supported this notion. He stated: “If there was a real rebellion, 
as I submit there was… then General Dyer’s actions were justified.”12 Moreover, Carson 
used the memory of the 1857 Indian Rebellion to reinforce his claims that General Dyer 
might have saved the Punjab from a violent revolution. He suggested that:  
It may have been that [the shooting] which saved the most bloody outrage in that 
country, which might have deluged the place with the loss of thousands of lives, 
and may have saved the country from a mutiny to which the old mutiny in India 
would have appeared small. 13  
Recalling the 1857 rebellion was a tactic used frequently by Dyer’s right-wing advocates 
to garner support during the Amritsar debate.  
Whilst riots had taken place throughout the Punjab in the days preceding the massacre, 
order had been restored in the city and across the region by April 13th. Both the findings 
of the Hunter Committee Inquiry and existing scholarship on Amritsar reject the claims 
that a widespread rebellion was occurring in the Punjab, or was about to take place, in 
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the spring of 1919.14 Nevertheless, the fear of a rebellion and the potential long-term 
consequences for the Empire was real for many Unionists. Carson explained to the 
House of Commons that "the revolutionary elements of India, Ireland, Egypt, and other 
nations have shaken the supposed invulnerability of England."15 Hence, the notion that 
any challenge to British imperial authority, whether it was in "Londonderry, or Dublin, 
or London, or India"16, should be met with force, underpinned the right-wing defence of 
Dyer in Parliament. In their view, a firm hand was needed for the maintenance of 
Britain’s authority in India, Ireland, and across the globe. Therefore, Dyer's actions were 
right and justified.  
The lionisation of General Dyer and the persistent defence of his actions as necessary 
and justified due to a rebellion qualified the second line of the right-wing argument: 
That Dyer was the true victim in the Amritsar controversy. For Dyer's supporters, he 
was “the man who had saved the Punjab",17 yet he had been censured by the British 
Government and forced to retire. Dyerists recognised this as an attempt to scapegoat 
the officer. As discussed in chapter 2, the British Government did indeed present Dyer 
as the sole perpetrator in order to deflect blame to an extent, and Edward Carson in 
particular objected to this. He stated that officers should not suppose “that if they do 
their best… that they will be made scapegoats of and be thrown to the wolves to satisfy 
an agitation such as that which arose after this incident.” 18 – An "agitation" driven by 
Indian nationalists. As previously noted, the idea of Dyer being “thrown to the wolves” 
is also upheld by some historians. Lieut. Colonel James, another prominent Irish 
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Unionist politician, also supported this notion insisting that the Hunter Commission 
Inquiry was only held “to find a scapegoat or to whitewash somebody in authority.”19 
Lord Ampthill also argued that Dyer was scapegoated in an attempt to satisfy radical 
Indians.20 By identifying Dyer as a scapegoat and victim of the Hunter Inquiry and the 
British Government, his supporters challenged the official representation of the 
Amritsar Massacre which was founded on the insistence of Dyer’s personal culpability. 
Moreover, presenting Dyer as a scapegoat was an attempt, perhaps, to blame parts of 
the administration such as the Secretary of State for India, who were, in their view, too 
reluctant to use the ‘iron fist’ approach preferred by British and Irish Unionists, and 
appeared too willing to appease Indian nationalists’ demands. 
Furthermore, the pro-Dyer faction in both Houses attempted to portray the officer as a 
victim by highlighting that he was in a difficult situation in Amritsar, and was censured 
without having had a 'fair trial'. For example, Carson described the position in which 
men such as Dyer are placed as a “terrible responsibility.”21 He asked the Commons, 
“before you break him, and send him into disgrace: Is he going to have a fair trial?”22 
Dyer's supporters found it an outrage that he would suffer forced retirement without 
having been tried in court. Carson utilised the idea of ‘Britishness’ to further this attack 
on the Government’s 'unfair' censure of Dyer. He stated:  
You talk of the great principles of liberty which you have laid down. General Dyer 
has a right to be brought within those principles of liberty. He has no right to be 
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broken on the ipse dixit of any commission or committee, however great, unless 
he has been fairly tried.23   
Carson proceeded to call out the treatment of General Dyer by the British Government 
as “un-English.”24  
Lord Ampthill, Governor of Madras from 1900-1906,25 also maintained this argument in 
the House of Lords. He stated: "No Englishman will dare to deny that any man, who is 
accused or suspected of an offence, is entitled to a fair trial before he is condemned and 
punished… That is a fundamental principle of the laws of England".26 Again, the notion 
that ‘Britishness’ or 'Englishness' was a power of justice was promoted, just as it had 
been during the construction of the British Government’s view of Amritsar. Whilst 
Winston Churchill used this idea of ‘Britishness’ to censure General Dyer the pro-Dyer 
right-wing utilised this notion to argue that he had been treated unfairly. However, 
there was a clear hypocrisy in the conservative view over the right to a fair trial under 
British justice. For example, this right was denied to Indian men and boys who General 
Dyer had flogged without trial for assaulting a European woman in the days preceding 
the massacre.27 But this did not concern Dyer’s supporters, to them this right to British 
justice and fair trial only applied to “gallant” British officers, not Indian civilians. 
Churchill counter-argued against claims that Dyer had the right to a civilian trial by 
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outlining the distinctive procedures for misconduct in the military. He noted that “the 
procedure is well understood”, including by General Dyer, who did not dispute it.28 
Finally, the right-wing defence of General Dyer was not only based on the portrayal of 
him as both a hero and a victim. The pro-Dyer camp also attempted to demonise and 
blame the real victims of Amritsar; the hundreds of civilians who were shot down by 
unprovoked rifle fire. They associated the crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh with the riots 
that had occurred several days earlier, accusing them as a whole as guilty of those 
crimes committed prior to the gathering taking place. General Dyer himself saw the 
crowd as a guilty collective, describing them as “a defiant, organised, and rebellious 
mob, with a record of at least two days of outrage and treason behind it”.29 In support of 
this, Lord Ampthill described the Indian assembly as "human masses, bent on violence, 
who have already tasted blood." 30 
The fact that crowd were gathered 'unlawfully' was also emphasised in an attempt to 
criminalise them further. Despite the Hunter Commission Reports evidencing that 
Dyer’s proclamation which had prohibited public gatherings had not been read out 
sufficiently, Dyer's defenders disagreed. Ampthill maintained:  
Anybody who has even paid a visit to India knows that news of any kind goes like 
wildfire round an Indian city… Anyone who knows anything about India is aware 
that every single man of that crowd knew of the Proclamation and, in fact, was 
there in order to defy it. 31 
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For Ampthill, the nature of Indian cities and their populations meant that reading the 
proclamation out more widely than had been done, was unnecessary. The Indians at the 
Jallianwala Bagh knew one way or the other that their gathering was prohibited, but 
they chose to assemble regardless. 
In addition to this, many of Dyer’s supporters attempted to argue that the crowd were 
armed with dangerous weapons.32 The Hunter Commission found that the crowd were 
gathered peacefully, and that only some were ‘armed’ with sticks. Nonetheless, Lieut. 
Colonel James argued to the Commons that the crowd were dangerously armed, “not 
with rifles or pistols, but with lethal weapons of considerable strength, and they were 
opposed by a mere handful of fifty men.”33 For James, these sticks could have been lethal 
if used against Dyer’s small force. Furthermore, the size of Dyer's force was persistently 
contrasted with the size of the crowd, portraying the Indian people as a giant mob 
against a few British soldiers. Joynson-Hicks emphasised this in the Commons by stating 
that “the mere impact of the crowd would have swept General Dyer and his force 
absolutely out of existence if they had attacked him”34, as did Earl of Middleton in the 
Lords,35 who claimed that "the mere weight of the crowd would have annihilated it."36 
Dyer’s force was indeed small compared to the size of the crowd, but as explained by the 
Hunter Reports, these civilians were gathered peacefully, most were sitting down, and 
their 'sticks' were little threat in the face of rifles. This idea of a small number of British 
troops facing a large armed Indian mob was another attempt to demonise the crowd, 
and ultimately frame the victims of the Amritsar Massacre as the perpetrators. 
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Dyer’s right-wing defenders failed to win the majority of votes in the House of 
Commons and the debate resulted in a vote in favour of the Government. However, 129 
MPs voted against the Liberal-Conservative Coalition, 92% of which were Unionists. 
Leader of the Conservative Party, Andrew Bonar Law, commented: "We got through, but 
half our party voted against us."37 The Government only gained a majority due to 
support from the Opposition. Without the support of Independent Liberals and the 
Labour Party, the pro-Dyer British and Irish Unionists would have won the debate. In 
addition, the defence of General Dyer in the House of Lords debate resulted in success 
for the right-wing Dyerists, and a vote against the Government. 
 
The Defence of Dyer in the Right-Wing British Press 
Due to heavy press censorship in the Punjab, news on the Amritsar Massacre was not 
widely reported in Britain until the final months of 1919. Kaul explains that initial 
reports of unrest in the Punjab were strictly based on official telegrams from the 
Government of India, which "made little attempt to present an informed picture of the 
general situation".38 News of repression by the Government in the Punjab did not go 
completely unreported, for example, the bombing of Gujranwallah that occurred at this 
time was reported in the press in London. However, the massacre at Amritsar "was 
largely absent from the news." The Bombay Chronicle later described that the Indian 
press had been "gagged", and only "pro-government versions of the trouble" were 
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produced.39 This policy of news management in India had been recognised prior to the 
Amritsar crisis, with The Times criticising Montagu for "bottling up information about 
India".40 However, Montagu himself appeared frustrated by the lack of information and 
delays in communications from India around this time.41 As explained in chapter 2, this 
led to a delay in an official response to the Massacre in London, and delays to any 
investigative action taken by the Secretary of State. 
Nonetheless, once the Hunter Commission began its inquiry reports became much more 
frequent and high profile. The right-wing press who supported Dyer were especially 
vocal in run up to the Hunter reports being published. The notions of Dyer being a 
victim and hero, and the Indian people as criminal, and to blame, resonated in a number 
of reports. For example, the Daily Mail helped to heroise General Dyer, quoting that he 
shot to quell "seditious conspiracies"42 and "to save the British Raj".43 The newspaper 
maintained that the majority of Englishmen in India believed that if it was not for Dyer, 
"the whole of the Punjab would have been consumed by the flame of anarchy." 44 This 
was also maintained by the Daily Telegraph, which described Amritsar as “the effectual 
suppression of a most dangerous uprising.”45 Similarly, the Daily Express argued that if 
Dyer had not fired immediately, it might have “led to violence recalling the horrors of 
the Mutiny.”46 The Indian Rebellion of 1857 was referred to frequently throughout the 
public discourse defending Dyer. The Express proceeded to state: "We hold India by the 
sword, and we are there to rule and govern"47 - a contentious notion central to the 
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Amritsar controversy. In addition, the Daily Mail emphasised that the massacre was a 
"story" of a "tiny loyal force against a great crowd of Indians"48, just as many politicians 
would do in Parliament in the following months, when attempting to justify why 
General Dyer fired without warning. 
The Mail also framed Dyer as a victim by endorsing the idea that the Massacre was his 
"horrible dirty duty"49, similarly to how politicians would emphasise the 'difficulty' of 
Dyer's situation to both Houses. This specific article criticised the Government 
treatment of Dyer, by stating that "while the authorities had been 12 months making up 
their minds about him he only had 30 seconds in which to decide what to do at 
Amritsar."50 Again, this promoted the notion that Dyer had been forced to deal with a 
very difficult situation which he was now being condemned for. The Daily Telegraph 
also insisted that it “would be wrong and cruel to underestimate his difficulties.”51 
Furthermore, the Daily Mail also tried to criminalise the crowd, persistently describing 
them as a "mob". The newspaper purposefully drew attention to the attacks on 
Europeans which had occurred during the riots in the days preceding the massacre, just 
as right-wing politicians did in an attempt to associate the crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh 
with these crimes.52 The Mail also tried to place blame on the victims of the Amritsar 
Massacre by explaining that Dyer had issued a proclamation which had prohibited 
public gatherings, and insisting that "notwithstanding these proclamations the Indians 
gathered in large numbers", causing General Dyer to command fire.53  
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Interestingly however, upon the Hunter reports actually being published, even the Daily 
Mail recognised that Dyer "cannot escape the suspicion that his decision in a moment of 
grave crisis was influenced by personal feeling", and came to the conclusion (albeit 
alongside further reproach of the administration) that he "was justly condemned".54 
Equally, the Daily Express stated that "the judgements passed on a most unfortunate 
officer cannot be impugned."55 These admissions would never have been heard from 
Dyerists such as Carson in Parliament. The conservative press did maintain their 
criticisms of the Government into the summer of 1920, but surprisingly, despite taking a 
pro-Dyer line which mirrored the right-wing political rhetoric that defended Dyer 
throughout the Hunter Inquiry and in the Parliamentary debates, eventually the British 
press generally agreed (in print) that General Dyer had, at the very least, made an error 
of judgement.56  
The Morning Post was an exception, and remained a beacon for Dyer’s defenders as they 
upheld their pro-Dyer stance fiercely throughout the entire controversy. They described 
Dyer as “the man who saved India”57, again, portraying him as a hero by claiming that he 
crushed “a conspiracy against British rule”58. The Post strongly condemned the censure 
of General Dyer and criticised the British Government and the Government of India by 
stating that they had chosen “to sacrifice General Dyer to the susceptibilities of the 
native agitators”. They echoed Carson's defence of Dyer and criticisms of the India Office 
and Government of India across their pages. The Morning Post also argued: “These 
methods will lose India, just as they are losing in Ireland.” 59 The Morning Post were 
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clearly in favour of the ‘iron-fist’ approach to imperial governance and saw a connection 
between the Amritsar debate and the situation in Ireland, just as the right-wing 
politicians who defended Dyer in Parliament did. 
Moreover, it was not just in articles and editorials where the Post’s support for Dyer and 
opposition to the Government response to the Amritsar Massacre was demonstrated. 
The Morning Post initiated a public collection fund the day after the House of Commons 
debate to show support for Dyer and their objection to his censure. In an appeal to its 
readers, the newspaper stated:  
A great wrong is being done to a man who served his country well – who by his 
courage and decision in a moment of dangerous crisis, averted an immeasurable 
calamity. For this service the reward is – a broken career… He is not only broken 
but financially crippled… We forthwith propose to open a General Dyer fund.  
The fund raised over £10’000 within a week, with Edward Carson and Sir Michael 
O’Dwyer being some of the first contributors. The final total reached £26’317, “which 
Dyer received along with a golden sword and the title ‘Defender of the Empire’.”60 The 
Editor of The Morning Post was sent waves of letters containing contributions which 
demonstrated that a large number of British people, a third of whom were Anglo-Indian, 
believed like the newspaper itself and the pro-Dyer faction in Parliament that the 
General was being victimised for saving the Raj. 61 For example, a letter stating that the 
treatment of Dyer was “unjust” was sent by Sir George Burton Hunter, a prominent 
shipbuilder from Sunderland, with a donation of £10.10.0d enclosed.62 The enthusiastic 
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response to the Dyer fund demonstrated a strong support for Dyer from members of the 
British public, as well as from this organ of the right-wing press. 
 
Connecting the Defence of General Dyer to the Croke Park Massacre 
What is particularly interesting about the defence of General Dyer within the context of 
this thesis, is that the key lines of argument used by British and Irish Unionists and 
promoted by the right-wing press which challenged the British Government’s decision 
to censure General Dyer for the Amritsar Massacre, foreshadowed those used by the 
British Government in their defence of the Crown Forces after the shooting at Croke 
Park. As explained in chapter 2, the final account of the Croke Park Massacre that was 
presented to Parliament on 23rd November 1920 by the Chief Secretary of Ireland was 
constructed around the idea that the crowd at Croke Park were in some way criminal, 
and that the spectators were somehow responsible. The debate held on 24th November 
1920 to discuss the shooting and the broader issue of reprisals also maintained these 
notions. In addition, this debate saw two other aspects of the defence of Crown Forces 
come in to play: The portrayal of British forces in Ireland as heroes, and the portrayal of 
British forces in Ireland as victims. 
The official statements on Croke Park vilified the spectators by maintaining that many 
were Sinn Feiners who were responsible for the assassinations of 14 British Officers 
that morning. The Government attempted to associate the crowd with these 
assassinations, just as the pro-Dyer camp and General Dyer himself had associated the 
crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh with the riots and attacks on Europeans in the days 
preceding the shooting at Amritsar. In addition to this, the Government insisted that 
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many in the crowd at Croke Park were armed, just as right-wing supporters of Dyer had 
argued to be the case at Amritsar. However, evidence suggests that this was an 
exaggeration with regard to Amritsar, and simply untrue in the case of Croke Park. Both 
crowds, Irish and Indian, were demonised to an extent in order to justify the 
unprovoked shooting by British forces on native civilians, without warning. 
The British Government also persistently focused on the morning’s assassinations 
throughout political discourse after Croke Park as part of their construction of the 
Crown Forces as the true victims. Other examples of British troops and police being 
ambushed across Ireland were also recalled in Parliament for this purpose. Greenwood 
argued that the RIC was in an impossible situation in Ireland, similarly to how General 
Dyer’s position had been described “difficult and most objectionable”63 by his 
supporters. Moreover, Colonel Croft criticised those who disapproved of the Crown 
Forces’ attacks on civilians by stating that these men did not have the luxury of deciding 
what to do afterwards, they had to decide in the moment, and Parliament should stand 
by that decision. Carson maintained a thought akin to this during the Amritsar debate, 
stating to the Commons "it was impossible [for Dyer] under the circumstances calmly to 
make up his mind in the way you would do".64 
Furthermore, the Chief Secretary presented the forces responsible for the shooting at 
Croke Park as heroes by describing them as "gallant soldiers"65 with "decorations for 
valour"66, just as Dyer had been described as a "gallant officer", "without a blemish on 
his record"67. Greenwood maintained that soldiers such as those at Croke Park were 
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fighting for peace in Ireland – suppressing the revolutionary force of the IRA Using this 
to try and justify the shooting at Croke Park echoed the right-wing argument that Dyer’s 
orders to fire were excusable as he had suppressed a revolutionary force at the 
Jallianwala Bagh. Moreover, Greenwood also recalled the Easter Rising in order to 
bolster his portrayal of the RIC as heroes, stating that they "helped to save this country 
during the rebellion of 1916"68, just as right-wing politicians and the right-wing press 
had recalled the Indian Rebellion in order to reinforce their defence of General Dyer. 
A connection between the reporting of both atrocities within the conservative press is 
notable. Just as newspapers such as the Daily Mail had promoted pro-Dyer rhetoric, they 
supported the Government's official representation of Croke Park – even exaggerating 
official accounts on occasion. The Daily Mail claimed that it had been a “battle between 
troops and Sinn Fein suspects”, in which “10 Sinn Feiners were killed, and a man and 
woman were crushed to death when the crowd stampeded.”69 The Daily Mail's initial 
reports sought to vilify the victims of the shooting, accusing them of being members of 
Sinn Fein and blaming the crowd for the casualties. The newspaper also maintained the 
false notion that many spectators were armed,70 presenting the victims as perpetrators 
in the same way the pro-Dyer right wing had portrayed the victims of Amritsar. The 
Morning Post focused extensively on the assassinations of the British Officers that had 
occurred on the morning of 21th November 1920 but very little on Croke Park, in the 
same way Greenwood did in Parliament. This also parallels with the Dyerist press and 
politicians who persistently emphasised the riots preceding the Amritsar Massacre 
rather than the shooting itself. An article titled "DUBLIN VICTIMS"71 only discussed the 
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British casualties of Bloody Sunday, excluding the Irish civilians shot dead. One of the 
only reports in the Morning Post that covered the Croke Park Massacre in any detail 
strongly promoted the Government view under the headline: "Lives Lost During Search 
For the Assassins".72 The Morning Post remained resolutely on the side of the British 
Forces rather than the victims, as it had done in the case of the Amritsar Massacre. 
Finally, it is interesting and important to note that unlike in the case of the Amritsar 
Massacre, the Government view of the Croke Park Massacre received much less 
criticism from right-wing politicians in Parliament and the right-wing British press. The 
few right-wing MPs who did criticise the Government after Croke Park were mostly 
concerned with the fact that this violence was committed ‘unofficially’, without orders. 
Thus, they took it as an opportunity to push for martial law in Ireland so that reprisals 
could be considered ‘legitimate' and an official part of Government policy. 73 This call for 
martial law was supported by the Morning Post, which despite supporting the 
Government in their portrayal of Croke Park, still expressed desire for a firmer 
approach in Ireland. 74  On December 10th 1920 the demand for martial law was granted 
across Cork, Tipperary, Kerry and Limerick. Arguably, this was due to pressure from 
Unionists who pressed for a firmer line. However, Lloyd George was initially reluctant 
to impose martial law. Ilahi argues that this was because the Government were 
desperate "to avoid another public controversy like the one Dyer brought to light", and 
criticisms of them for again using force as a means to maintain authority.75 The Labour 
Party's criticism of this policy will be discussed in the following chapter. In a similar 
fashion, this spectre of negative opinion in the aftermath of Amritsar may have 
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influenced the Government response to reprisals such as Croke Park. Conversely, 
however, it was fear of a backlash from the right wing as seen during the Amritsar 
controversy, rather than criticism from anti-Dyer groups who opposed using martial 
law, which directed their response. At a time when the situation in Ireland was 
increasingly difficult, Government policy needed support from the majority party in 
Parliament: the Unionists.  
Moreover, in response to Croke Park the Government took a more 'Dyerist' approach, 
and avoided the challenges that the British and Irish Unionists had presented in the 
Amritsar case. For the political right, both the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park 
Massacre were examples of “gallant” British men attempting to suppress revolutionary 
forces, whether they were Indian nationalists or the IRA. Both crowds at Amritsar and 
Croke Park were at the very least associated with crimes against British officials or 
civilians that had occurred prior to each shooting, and the British authorities 
responsible for the shooting were considered both the victims of difficult circumstance 
and the heroes who were needed to preserved the British Empire. After Amritsar, the 
British Government censured a British officer for this. After Croke Park, however, the 
RIC were defended by the Government and even praised for their conduct by some. 
Ultimately, the Government view of Croke Park exhibited that they backed "their men" 
and approved of ruling by the sword, as the Unionists demanded they should have in 
the case of General Dyer. Hence, the Government received support for their reaction to 
Croke Park after it had been denied by the pro-Dyer right wing after Amritsar, as their 
preferred approach to governing their 'empire in crisis' was appeased in the Irish case. 
To conclude, the Government response to the Amritsar Massacre was challenged by a 
number of right-wing politicians and pressmen who sought to portray General Dyer as 
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both a hero and a victim, and frame those killed at the Jallianwala Bagh as perpetrators. 
After the Croke Park Massacre, however, it was the Government who maintained that 
the Crown Forces were both heroes and victims in Ireland, and that the crowd at the 
football match on 21st November 1920 was to an extent criminal. As outlined in chapter 
2, however, the Government needed to blame Dyer in order to mitigate damage to 
Britain's reputation in India, and Dyer alone could be held responsible. In the Irish case, 
the Government needed to stand by the IRC,  not only because the situation in Ireland 
and the challenges to British authority appeared much more severe than that in India at 
this time, but no one man could be singled out to blame for the shooting at Croke Park. 
In addition, the Government needed to keep the British and Irish Unionist’s onside, and 
feared a backlash similar to that seen after Amritsar. Thus, they supported the I.R.C in 
the aftermath of Croke Park and demonstrated that they were agreeable with 
maintaining authority in Ireland via a policy of force; an approach which the right wing, 
particularly those who had defended Dyer, thoroughly supported. 
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Chapter 4 
The Labour Party Response to Amritsar and Croke Park 
 
The left-wing response to the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre has been 
particularly neglected by previous scholarship, as literature on both massacres has 
tended to give more attention to the right-wing response. For example, whilst Sayer and 
Collett acknowledge that the left-wing response contrasted the right-wing defence of 
General Dyer, discussion of the Labour Party is beyond the scope of their work.1 
Similarly, Ilahi recognises that the perspectives of Labour MPs contrasted with the 
Government’s representations of both events, but her focus remains primarily on those 
on the right who defended the perpetrators of these atrocities.2 Furthermore, Leeson 
looks specifically at Croke Park and employs the Report of the Labour Commission to 
Ireland as a source to an extent, but his article fails to provide an understanding of the 
left-wing response in Britain.3 The purpose of Leeson's article remains in line with 
much of existing scholarship on the massacres, which debates what happened and why. 
This chapter will contribute to existing literature on Amritsar and Croke Park and 
address this gap in the historiography by analysing the perceptions of the British 
Labour Party, and employing previously under-utilised sources. 
The Labour Party was made up of trade unions, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) 
which encompassed all Labour MPs, socialist societies such as the Independent Labour 
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Party (ILP), and other affiliated bodies which represented a broad range of views.4 It 
emerged from the 1918 coupon election as the main opposition to the Liberal-
Conservative coalition with 57 seats, increasing to 61 by 1920. However, the coalition's 
overwhelming majority made it difficult for Labour to impact policy, even with the 
support of the Independent Liberals and Irish nationalists in Parliament.5 Still, the 
Labour Party challenged the Government in the Commons over policy in India and 
Ireland, as seen in the aftermath of Amritsar and Croke Park.  
Due to the multifaceted nature of the Labour Party, opinions over India, Ireland and the 
Empire often differed. For example, the more radical ILP had advocated complete Indian 
and Irish independence from 1917,6 whereas the PLP generally sought more moderate 
solutions to satisfy anti-colonial nationalist movements, such as Dominion home rule.7 
Nonetheless, both advocated self-government in one form or another for all imperial 
subjects, and objected to violent repression as part of imperial policy. This view of 
Empire was encompassed by Chairman of the Labour Party Executive, W. H. Hutchinson, 
in a speech to the 1920 Labour Party Conference. He declared:  "For an Empire held 
together by force I have no use… I believe the day is coming when no people will be 
content to rule another or be ruled by another, and for that day the British Labour 
Movement works."8 This address was received with applause. It also introduces key 
themes around Labour's stance on imperial governance that underpin the arguments in 
this chapter. 
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The Labour Party was dominated by the trade unions both in membership and financial 
terms at this time. However, trade union influence was largely directed at safeguarding 
their members’ interests as workers rather than seeking to determine the overall 
direction of Labour Party policies.9 Hence, this chapter will give predominant focus to 
the views of the PLP and the ILP, who actively steered and influenced the political wing 
of Labour in 1920. Matthew Worley highlights that “the Labour Party from 1918 
actually comprised of hundreds of local parties informed by far more than the political 
priorities and perspectives voiced from the front benches of parliament”.10 However, 
investigating attitudes towards the massacres on a local level and the individual views 
of the numerous affiliated Labour organisations is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, by focusing on the stance of Labour MPs, who contested the right-wing 
view in Parliament, and on the ILP, who was often more radically left-wing in its ideas, 
alongside the views of two leading Labour newspapers, new light will be shed on 
Labour’s reactions to both massacres. This will illuminate the views of those who were 
at the opposite end of the political spectrum from the right-wing defenders of imperial 
violence, a perspective previously largely ignored by historians. 
The first section of this chapter will address Labour’s reactions to Amritsar. It will 
discuss news reports published in the Labour Leader and the Daily Herald. The Leader 
was the official weekly newspaper of the ILP which was edited by prominent party 
member, Katharine Glasier.11  It was purchased from the party’s first chairman and MP, 
Keir Hardie, in 1906.12  The Herald was independently owned and edited by George 
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Lansbury,13 who, after witnessing divisions in the Labour Party during the First World 
War, strived to ensure the newspaper was inclusive of the views of the whole of the 
Labour movement.14 The Herald was not officially owned by Labour until Lansbury 
passed his proprietorship and editorship to the party in 1922, but it had still been the 
mouthpiece for the Labour Party since the paper was established in 1912.15 The 
outcomes of the annual Labour Party conference held in June 1920 will also be 
discussed in this section, as well as the views expressed by Labour MPs during the Dyer 
debate, and the challenges these presented to the British Government.  
The second section of this chapter will examine Labour’s perceptions of the Croke Park 
Massacre. This section will also utilise articles from the Labour Leader and the Daily 
Herald and consider the contributions made by Labour politicians during the 
Parliamentary debate held after the massacre. Similarities between Labour’s stance and 
that of Irish Parliamentary MPs will be considered. The IPP was the minority Irish 
nationalist party after only retaining 7 seats in the 1918 election, with the majority of 
Irish seats going to Sinn Fein. However, Sinn Fein's boycott of Parliament meant that 
they were the only Irish nationalists to sit in the Commons in 1920.16 Finally, the Report 
of the Labour Commission to Ireland, which investigated Croke Park and discredited the 
Government's representation of events, will be discussed. The sources in this section 
have been particularly neglected by historians. This chapter will show that the Labour 
Party deplored both atrocities, and illustrate how Labour challenged the official 
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representations, showed support for Indian and Irish nationalists, and criticised the 
British Government's approach to imperial rule in India and Ireland in 1920. 
 
The Amritsar Massacre 
From May 1919, the Labour Party and its associated organisations showed support for 
Indians and their abhorrence towards the approach employed to assert British 
authority in the Punjab that April. Working alongside Indian activist B. G. Tilak and the 
London Congress Committee, whose purpose was to raise awareness of Indian issues in 
Britain, Labour pushed the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, to set-up a 
public investigation into the Punjab disturbances and their suppression.17 In addition, 
the Labour Party and the Indian Committee of Workers Welfare League held a public 
meeting in London at which they circulated 10'000 copies of a pamphlet describing 
"butchery in India”18, in an attempt to alert the British public of the violence used to 
quell the unrest. This mounting pressure from Indian nationalist organisations, who, 
with the assistance of the Labour Party expressed their concerns in Britain, eventually 
resulted in the formation of the Hunter Commission which was tasked with 
investigating the unrest in India. Labour’s initial response to the Punjab Disturbances 
demonstrated solidarity with Indians and bolstered Indian nationalists’ demands for a 
public inquiry. 
Disgust towards the repression seen in the Punjab that Spring increased during the 
Hunter Commission's investigation. The strict press censorship that had been imposed 
by Sir Michael O'Dwyer earlier that year could no longer muzzle the story of the 
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shooting, and details regarding the Amritsar Massacre specifically finally came to light 
in Britain. Hence, by December 1919 organs of the Labour Party were expressing their 
objection to Secretary of State for India and demanding that the perpetrators of the 
massacre be punished. For example, a letter sent to Montagu by the Southampton and 
District Trades and Labour Council and Labour Representation Committee stated that 
they unanimously viewed "with horror and indignation the massacre of Indians at 
Amritsar". They demanded "the immediate recall and impeachment of General Dyer and 
those associated with him in the ghastly outrage of defenceless people".19 Another letter 
sent to Montagu in December 1919 from the Kingston-upon-Thames Labour Party 
expressed "horror and disgust" at the shooting, and called upon the Government "to 
severely punish those responsible for this outrage."20 The members of the Derby 
Independent Labour Party also protested to "the brutal massacre".21 By the year's end, 
Labour’s opposition to the treatment of Indians at Amritsar and across the Punjab was 
already clear. 
Furthermore, the Labour Leader and the Daily Herald published numerous articles in 
the run up to the publication of the Hunter Reports, which maintained Labour’s anti-
Dyer stance. These newspapers did not accept that General Dyer was the sole 
perpetrator, as the British Government would have the public believe. By March 1920, 
the Labour Leader was blaming the British imperial administration as a whole for the 
Punjab Disturbances and the Amritsar Massacre. The Leader described how the 
implementation of the Rowlatt Acts and arrest of Indian nationalists had sparked the 
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riots in April 1919.22 The Daily Herald agreed, stating that "there was no 'mob' 
movement until the arrest of well-known Indian political leaders".23 The Leader went on 
to denounce O'Dwyer's governance as a "Reign of Terror".24 The newspapers also 
demanded that the Viceroy be recalled and that the Governor of the Punjab be sent back 
to Britain with General Dyer to be tried. The Leader and the Herald insisted that Dyer be 
punished alongside his superiors, not in isolation. 
When the Hunter Commission reports were finally published in May 1920, the Leader 
and the Daily Herald reacted with further criticism. The Herald described the Majority 
Report as an "amazing endeavour to whitewash all British officials concerned".25 On 
June 3rd the Leader headline read: "THE HUNTER REPORT. - How It Hides the Ugly 
Truth of the Punjab Terror."26 These descriptions of the report challenged to the official 
representation of Amritsar, as the Government's narrative was based on the findings of 
the Commission. The Herald claimed that the effects of the report in India would be 
"most grave"27 due to its lenient judgements of Dyer and the Government of India. The 
Leader explained how the Amritsar Massacre had alienated Indians from Britain, and 
how the leniency of the Majority Report would potentially worsen this estrangement. In 
addition, the Leader and the Herald printed the opinions of V. J. Patel, General Secretary 
of the Indian National Congress, to reveal his thoughts on the Hunter reports (another 
example of solidarity with Indian nationalists). In line with the Labour Leader and Daily 
Herald, Patel stated that the Viceroy and the Governor of the Punjab, as well as General 
Dyer, needed to be held to account; otherwise there would never be reconciliation 
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between the British and the Indian people.28 Patel aimed much of his criticism at 
O'Dwyer,29 claiming that the arrest of national leaders under his orders was a deliberate 
provocation of unrest.30  Patel stated: "his determination to put down constitutional 
agitation against the Rowlatt Act" was reason for the violence against Indian civilians. 
By holding additional authorities responsible, Indian nationalists and the Labour press 
challenged the official view that the Amritsar Massacre was the fault of one man. 
In contrast to the Government narrative Labour represented General Dyer’s actions as 
symbolic of Britain's harsh approach to maintaining authority in India. Dyer was a 
representative example, not an anomaly. The Herald argued: 
The terror in the Punjab was but the logical consequence of the methods of 
administration which Sir Michael O'Dwyer practised and which Lord Chelmsford 
approved. It was the inevitable outcome of their policy of ruling India as a 
conquered country to be kept in submission by the sword.31  
Labour were against ruling by oppression as they considered this to be neither an 
effective nor a just way of governing the Empire, especially at a time when colonised 
peoples were increasingly questioning the Empire’s legitimacy. Hence, they denounced 
ruling by violence throughout the Amritsar controversy. Under the headline, 
'Harvesting Hate: The Madness of the Rulers of the British Empire'32, the Leader 
described numerous challenges to British authority including those in India and Ireland 
during imperial crisis. The article explained: "Daily the foundations of Brute Force in the 
British Empire are being more clearly exposed", and called its readers to "influence the 
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minds of their fellow citizens that a final end could be made of this worn out dream of 
military Empire".33 The Labour Leader and the Daily Herald showed aversion to ruling 
by the sword, and encouraged its readers to promote this stance. 
Moreover, as well as opposing Britain's harsh approach to imperial governance, the 
Herald and Leader also promoted self-determination for both India and Ireland.  The 
term 'self-determination' in this context refers to nationally conscious peoples 
controlling their own state and choosing their own Government. Although the term had 
been used since the 19th century, the principle of self-determination gained traction 
after WWI as it was listed in President Woodrow Wilson's 14 point plan for peace.  The 
Labour Leader argued for the ILP: "India and Ireland - When a Nation has made up its 
mind to attain its freedom, there is no power on earth, no, not even Great Britain, which 
can stand in her way."34 Here, the paper not only recognised self-determination for 
India (and Ireland) as inevitable, but acknowledged the similarity between the Indian 
and Irish situation. The Daily Herald concurred that "violence cannot repress forever the 
just claims of a people for the right to self-government".35 The Leader called for the 
Labour movement to actively demonstrate their condemnation of "the entire policy of 
oppression given such terrible and dramatic expression in the Amritsar Massacre" and 
demand “the unreserved right of self-determination" for India.36 The issue of self-
determination remained prominent for Labour throughout both controversies. 
However, it should not be assumed that Labour's understanding of self-determination 
was homogenous. In fact, it became clear in 1920 that the extent of what Labour meant 
by this principle needed clarifying for party members. Did self-determination mean self-
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government within the Empire, or self-government without reservation? The ILP and 
the Labour Leader, for example, considered self-determination to mean without limits, 
but the majority of Labour opinion equated self-determination for India with home rule. 
As explained below, the ambiguity of the term caused confusion and division at the 
1920 Labour Party Conference during discussions on Ireland. Nevertheless, the Labour 
Movement seemed in agreement that both India and Ireland had the right to decide 
their own government, whether that was under the condition of remaining within the 
Empire or otherwise. 
The attitudes expressed in the Daily Herald and Labour Leader in 1920 towards 'ruling 
by the sword' and 'self-determination' were maintained throughout discussions at the 
Labour Party Conference in June that year. The 14th Annual Labour Party Conference in 
Scarborough was the largest that had ever been held in the history of the British Labour 
movement. The conference addressed a number of issues regarding colonial policy, and 
the Manchester Guardian reported that "In the field of Imperial politics" the conference 
"found abundant material for framing a strong indictment of the Government."37 Labour 
MP and ILP member, Benjamin Spoor,38 moved a resolution on India. He insisted on the 
"full and frank application" of the principle of self-determination, demanded that the 
current Government of India be disbanded, and that they take responsibility for 
violence in the Punjab including the shooting at Amritsar.39 Sir Michael O'Dwyer was 
personally criticised by Spoor, who blamed the governor's policy of repression for the 
outbreaks of violence which climaxed at Amritsar, just as the Daily Herald and the 
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Labour Leader had done. He argued that O'Dwyer and the Viceroy should be returned to 
Britain.40  
Former Labour MP and longstanding ILP member, Ramsay MacDonald,41 supported 
Spoor’s demands, describing every day the Viceroy remained in India a "disgrace".42 In 
addition, MacDonald explained that the civil authorities in India had handed their 
responsibilities to Dyer who had "made a mess of it", and was now being saddled with 
the consequences.43 Essentially, MacDonald saw Dyer as being scapegoated to a degree 
for the broader failings of the Anglo-Indian administration. This is one of the scarce 
examples where Labour and Unionists, to an extent, agreed. Still, in stark contrast to the 
Unionist position, Macdonald also made it clear that ruling by force was not a legitimate 
approach to imperial governance. He stated: "the moment we could not maintain our 
relations in India on a civil basis, our position in India ceased to have any shred of 
justification."44 This echoed the view of W. H. Hutchinson, Chairman of the Labour Party 
Executive. 45 The Labour delegates at the conference unanimously supported the 
resolution which called for self-determination in India, criticised the administration, 
and condemned the “cruel and barbarous” actions of British officers in the Punjab.46 
Thus, by 8th July 1920 when a Parliamentary debate was called to discuss the case of 
General Dyer, the Labour Party had clarified its stance on the Amritsar Massacre. Ilahi 
appropriately summarises that the "Labour Party came out decisively against Dyer… 
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but, characteristically, pointed a finger at the entire administration.”47 In addition to 
this, Labour had criticised the Hunter Report as a whitewash, called for the punishment 
of all Anglo-Indian authorities, condemned the oppressive nature of the British Raj, and 
demanded self-determination for the Indian people. This stance was maintained by 
Labour MPs in the House of Commons.  
Benjamin Spoor was the key protagonist for the left in this debate, and was first to 
speak for the Labour Party. He reiterated the criticisms of Sir Michael O'Dwyer which he 
had voiced during the Labour conference, and his allocation of blame to the Government 
of India for inciting violence. While Spoor agreed that Dyer should be censured as his 
actions were unjustifiable, he also agreed with Ramsay MacDonald that the British 
Government and the Government of India were using General Dyer as a scapegoat to 
deflect criticism, and maintain the official portrayal of the Amritsar Massacre as an 
isolated incident.48  Spoor also condemned using force across the Raj and the Empire as 
a whole. Speaking on behalf of the Labour Party, he supported Edwin Montagu's 
perspective in that India could not, and should not be ruled by the sword.  
In recognising Dyer as a scapegoat, Spoor rejected the Government's 'singularity 
argument'. He challenged the official narrative that insisted that Amritsar was a-typical 
by stating in Parliament that it "is not an isolated event any more than General Dyer is 
an isolated officer."49 Fellow MP and ILP member, Colonel Wedgwood,50 concurred. He 
argued to the House that it was imperial system in India as a whole that was at fault, not 
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just Dyer personally.51 Wedgwood proceeded to quote Gandhi to the House to clarify his 
argument. He had stated: "We do not want to punish Dyer… we want to change the 
system that produces General Dyer."52 This further demonstrated solidarity with Indian 
nationalists. 
 Spoor bolstered this challenge to the official narrative with the claim that the Amritsar 
Massacre was in part the result of "a certain mentality that some men seem to possess 
in India in a most extraordinary degree.”53 He believed that the attitudes in of Anglo-
Indians were partially responsible both for the riots and the massacre, and encouraged 
the Government of India’s repressive approach to rule.  As Ilahi notes “Spoor hinted that 
Dyer, O’Dwyer… and many other officers who administered martial law were actually 
racist.”54 Undeniably, a mentality of 'Us' and 'Them' was inherent to the Raj, and was 
fostered by structural and cultural segregation. Sayer clarifies that an “unbridgeable 
distance was manifested in every detail of Anglo-Indian social life, from the prohibitions 
on ‘miscegenation’ to the architecture of civil lines.”55 These deep-rooted racial 
divisions only enabled violence against Indian civilians such as that seen at Amritsar. 
This racial mentality was also raised by the Editor of the Labour Leader, Katharine 
Glasier, who stated: 
The root of the whole trouble lies in the fact that British administrators in India 
regard themselves as the governors of an inferior subject race. So long as that 
idea dominates the British administration in India, there is no guarantee against 
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a recurrence of such deplorable incidents as the Punjab inquiry has definitely 
established.56 
Ben Spoor reiterated Labour’s view to the Commons that General Dyer was emblematic 
of the broader nature of imperial rule in India, and that a mentality among Anglo-
Indians fostered a climate of opinion which would justify actions such as Dyer's.  
The House of Commons debate was another occasion when Labour declared publically 
that equality, not oppression, was the best approach to governing the Raj and the British 
Empire, as it had done at the Labour Party Conference that June. Hence, Spoor 
concluded his argument by maintaining Labour’s already established view that the only 
way to proceed in India was to move towards self-determination. Spoor argued that 
Britain needed to show the Indian people “that they are in the Empire on equal terms, 
so far as their ordinary rights are concerned, with every British citizen”, otherwise there 
would be no hope for long-term peace. He argued that showing, “unmistakeably, that 
the policy of governing India by a military police had been abandoned”, was central to 
this.57 Wedgwood agreed, stating that if the British want to preserve their Empire, then 
they must do so through the co-operation of Indians.58 J. R. Clynes MP,59 who became 
Labour Leader in February 1921, also expressed the party's desire "to enlarge the 
freedom of the people of India, to associate them more and more with the conduct and 
determination of their own affairs."60 For the Labour Party, self-determination was 
necessary in India, and indeed; inevitable. However, these arguments in Parliament do 
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suggest that the PLP were in favour of a moderate gradualist approach to achieving this, 
and defined self-determination as still keeping India within the British Empire. 
The Dyer debate resulted in a win for the Government with all 35 Labour MPs in 
attendance voting in their favour.61 However, this was a rejection of Edward Carson's 
pro-Dyer stance not a demonstration of support for the official view. In fact, the PLP put 
forward their own motion against the Government in the Commons on July 8th 1920 to 
protest the refusal to "impeach Sir Michael O'Dwyer, to recall Lord Chelmsford, and, 
most important of all, to repeal the repressive legislation in operation in India."62 This 
was opposed by the rest of the House, but it was a formal rejection of the official stance 
that Dyer was solely to blame. Nonetheless, Labour agreed that General Dyer still 
deserved censure and were against the pro-Dyer camp who championed ruling by the 
sword, thus voting in the Government's favour. To an extent, therefore, the 
Government's approach to managing the Amritsar crisis was successful, as they got the 
Opposition onside and ultimately won the vote, despite facing hostility from Unionists. 
The Labour Party's response to the Amritsar Massacre challenged the official view, 
stood in opposition to the right-wing defence of General Dyer, and demonstrated 
support for Indian nationalists and the victims of the Amritsar Massacre. A united 
Labour stance against General Dyer's actions was clearly articulated through the pages 
of the Labour press, the resolutions passed at the annual party conference, and the 
arguments presented in Parliament by Labour MPs. Nevertheless, Labour also 
considered Dyer's superiors as partially culpable for the massacre and the Punjab 
Disturbances as a whole, and asserted that they too should be punished. For the Labour 
Party, the Amritsar Massacre was not an isolated incident as the Government insisted, 
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but characteristic of imperial despotism in India which was in part fuelled by 
entrenched racist and militarist attitudes among authorities. They spoke out against the 
oppressive nature of the British Raj and upheld the view that Indians should be granted 
the right to a form of self-determination.  
There are several factors which may have influenced why the Labour Party responded 
to the Amritsar Massacre in this way. As discussed, Labour did not see ruling by the 
sword as an appropriate method of governance. Self-determination seemed 
unavoidable, and attempting to maintain authority through force would only serve to 
delegitimise British rule further. This stance could have been purely ideologically 
driven. The party constitution in 1918 formally accepted a socialist ideology,63 and 
component of this was that imperialism was understood as the highest stage of 
capitalism, leading socialists into a critical stance towards Empire. Moreover, as the 
Labour Leader argued, militarism was "a capitalist not socialist method".64 Hence, the 
militarist nature of rule in India was against Labours principles. Whilst attitudes to 
Empire did differ within the Labour Party, this conflict of ideology would provide 
further reason for some Labour Party members to oppose the preservation of imperial 
power through force. 
In addition, Labour's response may have had ulterior political motives, and the party 
might have been using the Amritsar Massacre for their own political advantage. A Home 
Office memorandum from December 1919 claimed that the Herald League, a socialist 
group made up of contributors, readers and supporters of the Daily Herald,65 were 
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"already making capital out of the Amritsar."66 Another memorandum from January 
1920 stated that the Labour Leader was emphasising "the usual Independent Labour 
Party moral that the British people are themselves responsible in so far as they permit 
the men who pursue a criminal policy to remain in power … Ramsay MacDonald and 
William Stewart in Forward reason in the same strain, that the only solution is for the 
people to change their government."67 This was an interesting time for Labour, who had 
“fared badly” in the coupon election, but had still emerged as the main opposition in 
Parliament.68 They were keen to bolster their support among the newly expanded 
electorate, which had been increased threefold after the passing of the Representation 
of the People Act in 1918.69 Perhaps the Labour Party reacted so fervently to the 
shooting at Amritsar with the purposeful intention of publically undermining the 
Liberal-Conservative Coalition, which was becoming more frequently divided. This 
would have also been a good occasion to create unity within the Labour Party, which in 
turn would strengthen it as a political force. 
Finally, Labour’s response to the Amritsar Massacre would have been influenced by the 
context of imperial crisis. Domestic challenges to the British Government were as 
frequent as the imperial challenges that arose during the crisis of Empire. British 
workers strikes were prevalent, as were fears of how the Government would respond to 
them. The Labour Party feared that the British administration was innately inclined to 
deliver harsh treatment to anyone who challenged it, whether they were in Britain or 
India. Ilahi explains that Labour "certainly did not want a strike to be put down a la 
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Jallianwala Bagh, nor would they welcome the harsh repression of the Irish variety.”70 
As will be seen in the following section, Labour also criticised violence against civilians 
in Ireland. Moreover, Derek Sayer describes the resolution condemning General Dyer 
that was passed at the Labour Party Conference as "wider working class identification 
with the victims” of Amritsar. A shared identity between those oppressed by capitalism 
in Britain and those oppressed by British imperialism abroad, alongside the anxiety of 
domestic unrest being faced with violent suppression such as that displayed at 
Amritsar, gave more reason for the Labour Party to challenge the Government’s stance 
and reject the 'singularity argument'.  
 
The Croke Park Massacre 
Labour’s response to the Croke Park Massacre was very similar to that seen in the 
aftermath of Amritsar. They demanded a public inquiry into violence in Ireland just as 
they had done after the Punjab Disturbances. The Labour Party argued against the 
perpetrators themselves and the Government's approach as a whole in Parliament after 
both cases. They also took the subsequent debates as an opportunity to express their 
aversion to militarism and belief in self-determination. Unlike with the Amritsar 
Massacre however, Labour's knowledge of and response to the shooting at Croke Park 
was much more immediate. British newspapers including the Labour press were 
publishing reports on the shooting immediately, and some began challenging the 
Government narrative that was being promoted by the Chief Secretary for Ireland.  This 
official representation of events focused on the assassinations that took place in the 
morning, attempted to criminalise the crowd, blame the victims, and present the 
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perpetrators as the true victims of violence. However, reports in the Daily Herald and 
the Labour Leader told a different story.  
Both the Leader and the Herald reported the assassinations that occurred that morning, 
but unlike the Government’s narrative and reports from newspapers such as the 
Morning Post, the Labour press gave equal focus to the events that occurred at Croke 
Park. The Herald described "The Football Massacre"71 as a reprisal, contesting Sir 
Hamar Greenwood's narrative outright. It stated that "on this huge mass of men women 
and children the now notorious reprisal tactics were tried."72 The Leader described the 
massacre under the headline: “FRIGHTFULNESS! Another week of its work in Ireland.”73 
The term frightfulness had also been used to describe General Dyer’s actions. The report 
explained that “at least 27 people had been killed and from 50 to 100 people more 
wounded in Dublin on Sunday last” 74, lumping the number of British and Irish 
causalities together. This showed that all the casualties inflicted were considered 
equally important, whether they be the British officers in the morning or the Irish 
civilians in the afternoon. The Leader described how the Crown Forces “fired one volley 
into the air… and without further warning fired into the packed crowd.” It stated that 
the official claim that the crowd provoked the firing “is declared by people who were at 
the match to be a lie”.75 The Daily Herald concurred, insisting that "the only shots fired 
were those fired by the Black and Tans",76 and completely contradicting the official 
portrayal of the massacre. 
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In addition, Columnist for the Labour Leader, John Jacks, commented on Croke Park in 
his regular feature, ‘The Maddening Crowd’. He had also written an article during the 
Amritsar controversy.77 He criticised the press for peddling the Government narrative 
by focusing on the morning assassinations over the shooting at Croke Park. He also 
made an explicit connection between the Croke Park Massacre and the Amritsar 
Massacre. In criticising the reporting of the Evening Standard in particular, he stated:  
This does not refer to the massacre of officers in their beds and to the massacre 
of people at their football match. It refers only to the former series of 
assassinations… Perhaps Amritsar has accustomed the Evening Standard to that 
sort of thing. After all, in Ireland the Irish are only “Natives” and the people on 
the football patch were probably “only working class!”… Sir Hamar Greenwood 
declares that the assassination of officers is the most awful tragedy in British 
history… But what about Amritsar, and Featherstone, and any number of colliery 
disasters where hundreds of men have been killed, not by pistols, perhaps, but 
by something equally deadly – dividends?78 
In this opinion piece Jacks was attempting to evoke a sense of working class solidarity 
with the victims of Amritsar, the victims of violence in Ireland, and those British 
civilians who felt victims of capitalist exploitation at home in Britain. Just as a shared 
identity of the oppressed may have influenced Labour’s response to the Amritsar crisis, 
it appears that it may have also played into responses to Croke Park and views on the 
broader situation in Ireland at this time. Whilst the extent of this broader working class 
identification is difficult to gauge on a grass-roots level, it is clearly acknowledged by 
Jacks and the Labour Leader, which officially propagated the opinions of the ILP.  
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Labour's broader condemnation of Government policy in Ireland after the Croke Park 
Massacre is also conveyed in the Daily Herald and the Labour Leader. Both newspapers 
blamed both the assassinations of British officers and the shooting at Croke Park on the 
Government and their “methods of terrorism”.79 The Herald argued that "what the 
Government's coercion leads to the terror in Dublin shows."80 This parallels how Labour 
blamed the oppressive policies of the Government of India for unrest and violence in the 
Punjab, which resulted in the Amritsar Massacre. The Leader maintained that either the 
British Government could not control Crown Forces in Ireland, or these violent actions 
against Irish civilians were taken “under the instigation or under the connivance of the 
Government”. 81 The newspaper suggested that the Chief Secretary for Ireland should 
resign, and that perhaps even the coalition Government as a whole should step down. It 
criticised Lloyd George personally for provoking additional problems in Ireland by 
“servile submission to the dictatorship of Carson”.82 It also charged Edward Carson, who 
was the main defender of General Dyer during the Amritsar debate, as a provocateur in 
the Irish situation. The Daily Herald also noted Carson's influence on Liberal MPs 
regarding the Irish situation.83 The Labour press made clear its detestation of reprisals 
and of the Government policy in Ireland. The Daily Herald and the Labour Leader both 
slated the coalition as responsible for the endless cycle of outrage and reprisals of which 
the Croke Park Massacre was characteristic.  
The stance taken by the Herald and the Leader in the aftermath of Croke Park paralleled 
that of Labour MP’s in the Commons. On 24th November 1920 the House deliberated 
Herbert Asquith's motion that deplored and condemned "methods of terrorism and 
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reprisals which involve the lives and property of the innocent.”84 With the debate 
focusing on violence directed at Irish civilians in general, less focus was given to the 
specific case of Croke Park by Labour MPs. Still, their objection to incidents of violence 
committed by Crown Forces against civilians such as the shooting at Croke Park was 
relentless, and the Members of Parliament who spoke on behalf of Labour persistently 
criticised the Government throughout the debate. In a similar fashion to that seen 
during the Amritsar debate, the PLP voiced their dissatisfaction with maintaining 
authority through force and pronounced their desire to see Ireland given freedom and 
control of its own political affairs.  
J. R. Clynes, who had also spoken in the Commons on the censure of General Dyer, was 
the main speaker for the Labour Party on November 24th. First of all, he criticised the 
Government for suggesting that those who disapproved of the situation in Ireland were 
slow to condemn the violence of the IRA.85 The Government was attempting to paint 
those who challenged the official view as demonstrating a lack of support for the Crown 
Forces, and lenience towards IRA violence. Clynes insisted this was not the case. Labour 
MP, Fredrick Roberts,86 also argued that those who were against the Government were 
not necessarily against the IRC. He stated: "Neither do we agree that they are deserving 
of the epithets in which some people indulge, or should be regarded as savages or 
murderers."87 Both Clynes and Roberts made it clear that the Labour Party were against 
violence on both sides, confirming Labour’s opposition to the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’. 
This contrasted the right-wing stance, which attempted to justify violence against 
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colonial subjects, whether they were Indian or Irish, but considered violence against 
British authorities abhorrent. 
Clynes proceeded to argue that the policy the Government was pursuing and had 
already pursued for generations in Ireland, was failing. Ruling by force had never, and 
would never work. He stated:  
The Government falls back on the plan which in all tradition and history has so 
far failed, the plan of applying superior brute force to those who were provoked 
to use brute force in the first instance… I urge upon the right hon. gentleman [the 
Chief Secretary] not to entertain the delusion that he, by these methods, can 
succeed.88 
Hence, for Clynes and the Labour Party, self-determination for the Irish people would be 
the only answer to the Irish question. He argued: "You can put an end to this painful 
Irish situation by throwing responsibility for Irish Government upon the vast majority 
of the Irish people who, it is admitted, have no sympathy with criminals."89 Clynes 
insisted that the current Government policy in Ireland was not a long-term solution, just 
as Ben Spoor maintained that the censure of Dyer would not be an effective long-lasting 
resolution for the problems in India. He held Chief Secretary Greenwood as responsible, 
describing his approach to governance as reducing the situation in Ireland to “a mere 
affair of a competition in murder.”90 Roberts agreed, and blamed all the murder on both 
sides on the Government's refusal to grant the demands of the majority of Irish people 
who want "the right to determine their own affairs."91 He maintained that the state of 
affairs in Ireland was the Government’s responsibility, not simply the soldiers on the 
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ground or the ‘Dyers’ of this story, as it was the Government who continued to enable 
repressive policies rather than concede self-determination. 
It is important to point out here the diversity within the Labour Party's understanding 
of 'self-determination' for Ireland, which became evident at the 1920 Labour Party 
Conference. The Times reported that a resolution was moved by Labour member and 
leader of the Fabian wing of the party, Sidney Webb,92 which criticised Government 
policy in Ireland and demanded that "the principle of free and absolute self-
determination shall be applied immediately… confirming the right of Irish people to 
political independence."93 However, it was requested by delegates that the resolution be 
redrafted as it did not clarify whether or not the conference would be approving of an 
Irish Republic, which some members were not willing to grant.94 The Manchester 
Guardian explained that "the Irish problem brought the delegates face to face with the 
need for a more scrupulous definition for what they meant by self-determination".95 The 
request to amend the resolution to mean self-determination within the British Empire 
was rejected. 96 The conference committed to full self-determination. Despite this, 
however, it was clear by November 1920 that "the leadership of the party preferred for 
there to be a meaningful constitutional link between the two countries."97 This was 
clarified by Leader of the PLP, William Adamson,98 in Parliament. The PLP stance 
comprised of the armed forces being withdrawn from Ireland, and the question of Irish 
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Government relegated to an Irish Constituent Assembly, which would be elected via a 
free vote and draw up a constitution. However, Adamson stated that Labour's support 
of this constitution depended on two conditions: The protection of minorities and the 
prevention of Ireland becoming a military threat. This position offered Ireland "the 
maximum of national self-government consistent with the unity of the Empire and the 
safety of the United Kingdom"99, and was supported by Labour's National Executive 
Committee.100 The commitment to this conditional self-determination became party 
policy, but more radical ILP members remained supportive of self-determination 
without reservation. Hence, opinions on Ireland within the Labour movement remained 
varied. 
Nonetheless, the response from the Labour Party to the Croke Park Massacre and the 
broader issue of reprisals in Ireland in 1920 challenged the British Government by 
demonstrating a level of support for the Irish nationalist cause, as they had done in the 
Indian case. Similarities between the attitudes of Labour and the view of Irish 
nationalist MPs were clear. For example, Irish Parliamentary Party MP and key 
protagonist for the Irish nationalists in Parliament, Joseph Devlin, blamed Edward 
Carson for the levels of hostility in Ireland,101 as the Labour Leader did. Devlin also 
condemned as ‘arrant hypocrisy’ the fact that the Government only condemned the 
murders against policemen and not those against civilians.102 In line with Labour’s view 
Devlin stated, “I condemn all murders”, and blamed Government policy completely for 
“every drop of the blood” shed.103 He concluded that the main cause of trouble in 
Ireland was that the British would not let the Irish govern themselves, just as Clynes and 
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Roberts had done in their speeches. Additionally, like the Labour Party, despite all the 
violence committed against Irish civilians, Devlin did not necessarily lay the blame on 
the soldiers on the ground. He clarified: “I believe, in my heart, that the Royal Irish 
Constabulary hate so loathsome task.” Devlin saw the fault as lying with the British 
Government who “have tried every method that human ingenuity and lack of humanity 
has inspired in dealing with the Irish question, but they have never once tried the right 
one.”104 Finally, Devlin called for an impartial judicial tribunal to look into the situation 
in Ireland to see whether it was the various press reports on reprisals that were lying to 
the British public, including those that debunked the Government representation of 
Croke Park, or whether it was the Chief Secretary. 
Joseph Devlin’s demand for an investigation into violence in Ireland during the debate 
following the Croke Park Massacre was also supported by Clynes and the PLP. Clynes 
criticised the Government for not holding an independent inquiry into reprisals, which 
he deemed a "necessity".105 This was not the first time the request had been raised in 
Parliament. Whilst the Punjab Disturbances and the Amritsar Massacre sparked 
controversy about the nature of British rule in India, the Labour Party was already 
engaged in contentious discussion regarding the approach to governance in Ireland 
prior to Croke Park. In the months prior to the massacre numerous MP’s had raised the 
issue of violence against civilians in Ireland and demanded answers. On 20th October 
1920, Chief Whip for Labour, Arthur Henderson, introduced the following motion to the 
House of Commons: 
This House regrets the present state of lawlessness in Ireland and the lack of 
discipline in the armed forces of the Crown, resulting in the death or injury of 
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innocent citizens and the destruction of property; and is of opinion that an 
independent investigation should at once be instituted into the causes, nature, 
and extent of reprisals on the part of those whose duty is the maintenance of law 
and order.106 
All of the 43 Labour MPs in attendance supported this vote of censure and demand for 
an inquiry.107 However, the motion was defeated by 346 votes to 79. It is unsurprising 
that the likes of Edward Carson and other pro-Dyer politicians voted against the 
motion.108  However, the steadfast refusal by the Government and right-wing politicians 
to publically investigate reprisals and police brutality only served to motivate the 
Labour Party to send its own commission of inquiry to Ireland.109  
The Labour Commission to Ireland, with Arthur Henderson MP as its Chairman, left for 
Dublin on the November 30th 1920 to "inquire into the whole question of reprisals and 
violence in Ireland."110 The public nature of this inquiry and the fact the findings were to 
be published in a report was comparable to the Hunter Commission inquiry. In contrast, 
however, this inquiry was not ordered by the British Government and the investigative 
committee was made up of Labour Party members, not Government officials or 
members of the High Court. During their investigation the Labour Commission visited 
several sites where reprisals were reported to have taken place. This included Croke 
Park, where they reconstructed the scene and took evidence from eyewitnesses which 
contested the official accounts.111 The results of Labour's inquiry discredited the official 
representation of the Croke Park Massacre, as well as the broader Government 
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narrative regarding imperial violence in Ireland that had been pushed by the 
Greenwood in the aftermath of the shooting. The findings of the military courts of 
inquiry that had taken place in the aftermath of the massacre, and the reports from 
these courts that contested the official portrayal of events were kept concealed from the 
British people. Unfortunately for the British Government, however, the Report of the 
Labour Commission to Ireland, completed in December 1920 and published in 1921, was 
available to the public. 
The first section of the report focused on reprisals and addressed the massacre at Croke 
Park, describing it as "one of the most important cases of shooting on a large scale" in 
Ireland.112 The Labour Commission made the point that there were more casualties at 
the Croke Park Massacre than there were at Peterloo.113 The notion of a shared 
experience of oppression among working-class British people and colonised people was 
again highlighted. The report also stated that the assassinations of British officers that 
occurred on the morning of November 21st had overshadowed the "equally callous 
murder" of those who suffered at Croke Park, thus stressing the equal humanity of Irish 
victims. This had already been argued by the Labour Leader and Labour MPs in the 
House of Commons.  
The purpose of the Commission's investigation into Croke Park was to "secure reliable 
evidence on those points on which the official statements conflicted with unofficial 
versions or which the Government had categorically denied or glossed over or 
ignored."114 The Commission concluded that whilst the shooting, in their opinion, was 
not a premeditated reprisal (as in the RIC went to Croke Park with the intention of 
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shooting at civilians), the assassinations that morning would have influenced the Crown 
Forces sent there that afternoon. The report also challenged the claims in the official 
accounts of the massacre that members of the crowd had fired first, just as the Daily 
Herald and Labour Leader had done. The report stated: "In light of the mass evidence 
available this charge would appear to be quite untrue."115 None of the witnesses 
interviewed by the Commission corroborated this part of Greenwood's official 
statement. In fact, evidence collected by the Commission indicated that the British 
troops began firing as soon as their vehicles pulled up at the ground.116 The Commission 
also noted that if Sinn Fein gunman had been stationed in or around the ground, then 
there would have been casualties among the Crown Forces, as well as the Irish 
civilians.117 These findings denoted that British Forces fired without provocation and 
without warning, directly challenging the Government narrative which, as we have seen, 
attempted to demonise the victims and lionise the perpetrators.  
The report of the Labour Commission acknowledged that a stampede had occurred at 
the football ground, as described in the Government's account. However, it described 
this as "natural" and condemned the "indiscriminate shooting of panic-stricken men" as 
unjustifiable, indefensible, and a result of incompetence. The report went on to criticise 
the intended plan to search the crowd to find the Sinn Fein gun men responsible for the 
morning’s assassinations. The Commission argued that, in the circumstances, it "was 
manifestly folly to expect the crowd to disperse in an orderly fashion", thus placing fault 
on the authorities. Interestingly, Joseph Devlin made a similar point in the House of 
Commons, maintaining that had assassins actually been at the football match then the 
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death toll could have reached 1,000.118 The commission described the entire operation 
as "dangerous", and its execution as "a lamentable failure".119 For the Commission, the 
authorities who ordered the search to take place made a severe error of judgement.  
These findings by the Labour Commission to Ireland exposed numerous aspects of the 
official representation of the Croke Park Massacre as false, and disputed the narrative 
that the crowd were in some way criminal or in some way to blame. In addition, the 
report also challenged the Government's portrayal of the Crown Forces as the true 
victims of violence in Ireland; not only in the case of Croke Park, but more generally 
speaking. The report stated: "So far as we have been able to ascertain, the terrorisation 
of persons in some way connected with the RIC has not been carried out on a scale 
comparable with the terrorisation of the mass of Irish people."120 The Commission 
recognised the official view as "untrustworthy". They went as far as saying that after 
investigating numerous reprisals their view was "diametrically opposed" to it with 
regards to these occurrences, and described statements made by the Chief Secretary as 
"characterised by a disregard for the truth."121 The Labour Commission maintained that 
despite most of the evidence submitted in its Report having been collated from 
unofficial sources, it still "rings true", and resolved that "the statements made by the 
Government, on the other hand, do not carry conviction."122 
The "main burden" of the report was explicitly stated as the condemnation of the 
Government's policy; a policy described as being one of militarism and violence.123 In 
line with the attitudes of the Labour Party, the Report of the Labour Commission to 
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Ireland held the Government, not just the men on the ground, culpable for reprisals 
taking place. The Commission also criticised the official defence, whitewash, and in 
some cases, complete denial of violence against civilians, for enabling the cycle of 
violence to continue. Ultimately, the Labour Commission argued that the only solution 
would be for the Labour movement and the British people to protest in "a united 
demand for the rescue of the Irish people from the rule of force and for the 
establishment of peace and freedom".124 The Commission argued that the situation in 
Ireland could only be resolved through negotiating a political agreement with Irish 
nationalists. As with the case of Amritsar, Labour believed that oppression would only 
reinforce the spirit of revolt.125 These sentiments echoed throughout Labour's response 
to the Croke Park Massacre in the Labour press and in Parliament. They also paralleled 
the push for self-determination and an end to ruling by the sword within the British 
Empire seen throughout Labour's response to the Amritsar Massacre. 
Finally, it is important to consider why Labour took such a strong stance against the 
Government's policy in Ireland in 1920.  In the case of its opposition to reprisals the 
economic impact was a key factor. Irish trade was suffering heavily due to the 
destruction by Crown Forces of property and machinery used for industry, "the general 
atmosphere of terrorism" and the suspension of railway lines.126 The systematic 
burning of creameries which were estimated to garner £1,000,000 worth of business 
each year was having devastating effects on the Irish economy. In addition, this would 
also have had an economic impact in Great Britain. For Labour, a Government policy 
which enabled suffering through the loss of livelihoods was not acceptable. The Labour 
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Party's concern regarding the economic effect that IRC violence had on Ireland and in 
Britain is contended in the Labour Commission's Report.   
The economic effects of imperial violence were a more pressing concern for Labour in 
the Irish than in the Indian case.  However, other concerns suggested in Labour's 
reaction to Croke Park were very similar to those they expressed in the case of 
Amritsar. Labour's response was again heavily influenced by a sense of imperial crisis, a 
sense of working class solidarity with other oppressed social groups, and the fear that 
working class unrest in England would be supressed in a similarly violent manner. This 
fear of violent suppression had already been expressed by Sidney Webb prior to the 
Croke Park Massacre at the Labour Party Conference. He argued that "arbitrary 
suppression and interference" was "bad enough" in India, but "when they happened so 
near to home it meant that our liberties in England were also being attacked." He 
insisted that if this approach to maintaining authority over the masses could be 
enforced in Ireland, it could be enforced in England as well.127 Another shooting of 
innocent civilians in Ireland, such as that seen at Croke Park, only aggravated these 
anxieties further.128 
 
The British Labour Party strongly objected to both the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke 
Park Massacre, and challenged the Government’s representations of both atrocities. 
Labour charged Anglo-Indian officials as equally responsible as General Dyer in the case 
of Amritsar, seeing the shooting not as an anomaly, but an example of the militarist 
methods that were inherent to the Raj. Thus, they rejected the 'singularity argument' 
advanced by the Government. After Croke Park, the Labour Commission investigated 
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what really happened on that football field in Dublin on 21st November 1920, and their 
findings completely discredited the official narrative regarding Croke Park, as well as 
the systematic use of reprisals in general. In stark contrast to the right-wing reactions, 
Labour also demonstrated solidarity with Indian and Irish nationalists in both cases. 
The PLP and the ILP saw these incidents of imperial violence as a result of oppressive 
Government policy that was failing to maintain peace in the Empire. For Labour, giving 
the Indian and Irish people control over their own government was the only resolution. 
Hence, Labour Party members, their press institutions and their MP's, all called for self-
determination, to one extent or another, and an end to the use of force in the aftermath 
of both crises. There are several potential ideological, political and economic 
explanations for this response. However, it is clear that at a time when discontent 
among the working class in Britain and unrest across the Empire was increasing 
simultaneously, the Labour Party hoped that the British imperial administration would 
turn away from ruling its citizens by the sword, whether they be in India, Ireland, or the 
metropole. 
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British Reactions to Amritsar and Croke Park: Connections and Comparisons 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis contributes to ongoing research that adopts comparative and transnational 
approaches to Indian and Irish history, as well as existing scholarship on the Amritsar 
Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre specifically. Previous literature on the massacres 
focuses predominantly on how and why the events took place, and who was to blame, 
whereas this thesis has addressed the British reactions to both shootings. Those few 
historians such as Ilahi who have considered some of the responses to Amritsar and 
Croke Park, centre their discussions on the views of the right wing. This thesis gives 
attention to the left-wing response that has previously been neglected. Moreover, this 
thesis also highlights new connections and comparisons between these two atrocities 
which have not yet received attention. For example, the similarities between the 
language used against the Government by the right to defend General Dyer, and that 
used by the Government after Croke Park to portray the victims and the perpetrators. 
British reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919, and the Croke Park Massacre 1920, 
were diverse, and polarised to the extreme. There were similarities and differences 
between the reactions of different political groups to the individual massacres, and well 
as contrast in the responses between each case. The British Government's reaction 
differed between Amritsar and Croke Park. Initial reactions to Croke Park were 
immediate, whereas it took months for any significant action to be taken in response to 
Amritsar. The inquiries conducted to investigate these atrocities were also different. 
The Hunter Inquiry was a public investigation which published its findings to the public, 
and its conclusions were used as grounds for the censure of General Dyer and the 
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official stance of the British Government. In the case of Croke Park, however, the 
inquiries were private, and the findings were concealed from the public for decades. The 
conclusions of these military courts of inquiry did not support the Government 
narrative, unlike the Hunter Reports after Amritsar, which gave foundations to the 
Government's 'singularity argument'. 
There are several reasons why the Government reactions differed between each case. 
The structures of the Indian administration and its relationship with the British 
Government meant that the response of the India Office was delayed; where as the Chief 
Secretary for Ireland could deal with Croke Park immediately. The censorship policies 
in the Punjab and in Ireland also contrasted, and the harsh nature of Michael O'Dwyer's 
censorship policy initially kept the Secretary of State for India and the British 
Government, ignorant to many of the details of the Amritsar Massacre. Moreover, after 
Croke Park there was no single scapegoat which could be blamed for the violence 
against civilians. Reprisals in Ireland were committed by Crown Forces as a collective, 
without orders. Censuring the IRC was not an option, especially when the country was 
at war, and there was no superior who gave the order to fire. On the other hand, 
censuring Dyer alone seemed relatively convenient. The varying political climates in 
India and Ireland also fed into this. Britain had to stand by their forces against the IRA, 
which had been overtly attempting to overthrow British rule. The IRC and Auxiliaries 
had to be portrayed as heroes defending Ireland from the 'murder gang'. In India 
however, there was no war, and Indian nationalists' had been optimistic during the war 
that they would be rewarded for their participation in the war effort, unlike the Irish 
nationalists, who had become increasingly agitated. Hence, the grievances of Indian 
nationalists had the potential to be soothed. For the Government, the whole Amritsar 
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affair could be gradually forgotten if the situation was managed effectively. However, 
the censure of General Dyer did not appease Indian nationalists and angered the right 
wing in Britain, although it was still successful to an extent, as it in won over the 
Opposition during the Parliamentary debates. 
Regardless of these differences between the Government reactions to Amritsar and 
Croke Park however, the motivations behind the official narratives of the events 
remained the same: To shield the Government and the imperial administration from 
scrutiny, and to protect the reputation of the British Empire. Hence, in both cases, the 
Government portrayed these atrocities as singular events. As well as this, the idea of 
'Britishness' was employed to propel these motives, and claim that either the actions of 
General Dyer were wrong or to defend the Crown Forces. In July 1920, Dyer's actions 
were "not the British way of doing business", but in reaction to reprisals committed by 
the R.I.C in 1920, these "chivalrous British soldiers" were defending Ireland and the 
Empire from the republican assassin. These uses of 'Britishness' in official responses to 
Croke Park demonstrated that this discourse was not only driven by a fear of post-war 
brutalisation of British society, as Jon Lawrence argues. They also confirmed that British 
officials were anxious to maintain the illusion in India, Ireland, and the metropole, of a 
British Empire built on justice and civility.  
However, the notion of 'Britishness' was also used to counter the official view of the 
Amritsar Massacre. The right wing used the idea of British justice to criticise the 
Government's treatment of General Dyer, claiming that his denial of a fair trial was "un-
English". However, this was counter argued effectively by Churchill. Still, the right wing 
presented a significant challenge to the Government during the Amritsar controversy as 
the official view condemned "the man of the spot" rather than the crowd of Indians that 
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the right wing persistently demonised. This was significant, as the challenges came from 
within the majority party of the coalition. In contrast, the Government faced little 
criticism from British and Irish Unionists after Croke Park. This was because the 
Government took a more 'Dyerist' approach in the Irish case. They not only "backed 
their men" but lionised them, and shifted culpability on to the Irish.  Arguably, the 
Government were more inclined to respond in this way, not only because of the reasons 
outlined above, but because they feared a backlash from Unionists similar to that seen 
in the aftermath of Amritsar. When the situation in Ireland was more hostile than ever 
before, and the Government was facing criticism from the Opposition over the Irish 
question, the Coalition needed its majority party onside. 
The right were consistent in their response to both massacres in that they defended the 
British perpetrators, and disregarded the Indian or Irish victims of imperial violence. 
They constructed a skewed portrayal of Amritsar in which the victims were the 
perpetrators and the perpetrators were the victims, and propagated a similar view 
when it was constructed by the Government in the case of Croke Park. Whether this was 
through claims that the Indian and Irish crowds had been armed revolutionaries, or 
representations of Dyer and the RIC as British heroes doing their duty in the face of a 
difficult situation; the notion of British justice that the right wing championed, only 
favoured the British. The Indians and the Irish were held to different moral standards to 
their colonisers. For the right wing imperialists, violence from Indians or the Irish was 
interpreted as criminal without question, but violence committed by the state "was seen 
as a matter of obligation… made necessary by the unruliness of the colonised 
themselves."1 Hence, when Dyer shot hundreds of unarmed civilians, he was a hero 
                                                          
1 Nicholas Owen, 'Facts are Sacred: The Manchester Guardian and Colonial Violence, 1930-1932', The 
Journal of Modern History, vol. 84 (2012), pp. 644-645. 
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doing his duty, but the victims of Amritsar were vilified for gathering unlawfully against 
a proclamation that most were probably unaware of,2 and held accountable as a 
collective, without trial, for violence against British authority seen in the days preceding 
the massacre, which they did not necessarily commit.  
These reactions to the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre brought to light 
contrasting views on how the Empire should be governed. This is clear in comparisons 
between the Labour Party view and that of Dyer's defenders. Whilst the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party protested ruling the Empire 'by the 
sword', the right wing pushed for a firmer line. Whilst the Labour Party showed support 
for Indian and Irish nationalists, and demanded that self-determination be granted (in 
one way or another), the right wing sought to tighten the grip. Similarly to the Unionists, 
however, Labour's response was consistent across both cases. They rejected the 
Government stance that both shootings were a-typical events, and agreed with the 
Unionists that Dyer was, to an extent, held culpable for the broader failings of the 
Government of India. Nonetheless, unlike the right wing, and the Government in the 
case of Croke Park, Labour still considered General Dyer and the Crown Forces 
perpetrators of crimes, but recognised that higher authorities in the Indian and Irish 
imperial administrations, and the British Government, were also responsible. 
Finally, it is clear that the political landscape in India, Ireland and Britain, had an 
influence on the Government's response to Amritsar and Croke Park. The broader geo-
political climate of the time also affected the right wing defence of Dyer. The reaction of 
the right was stimulated by the war in Ireland in particular, as well as other threats to 
imperialism across the globe such as Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism. Hence, the 
                                                          
2 Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar (New York, 2005), p. 253. 
121 
 
Unionists supported General Dyer due to their desire for an iron fist approach in India, 
Ireland and the Empire. In contrast, the Labour Party demonstrated aversion to ruling 
by the sword. This was not only because maintaining authority by force went against 
Labour's principles, and opposed India and Ireland's rights to self-determination, but 
because it was considered a threat to the Labour movement itself. The post war milieu 
and the crisis of empire presented domestic troubles as well as international challenges 
such as the anti-colonial nationalisms that concerned the Unionists. The Labour Party 
were anxious that should the working class challenge British authority as Indians in the 
Punjab and Irish republicans had done, they may face a similar fate. British reactions to 
the Amritsar Massacre and the Croke Park Massacre were all connected by the 
overriding context of imperial crisis. For the two political extremes discussed here, this 
manifested as a fear of changes to the imperial status quo, or a fear of the consequences 
should the status quo be challenged in Britain. 
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